



## ANTI-TRAFFICKING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

### ALBANIA ANTI-TRAFFICKING EVALUATION OCTOBER 24 – DECEMBER 19, 2005

December 7, 2005

This publication was produced for the United States Agency for International Development Mission in Albania. It was prepared by Susan Somach and Rebecca Surtees, Consultants for Chemonics International Inc.

The authors' views reflected in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

## CONTENTS

---

Acknowledgements	ii	
Acronyms and Abbreviations	iii	
Executive Summary	iv	
SECTION I	Background and Methodology	1
	A. Background	1
	B. Scope of Work	2
	C. Evaluation Methodology and Work plan	3
	D. Limitations	4
SECTION II	Program Impact	5
	A. Overall Findings	5
	B. CAAHT Program	6
	B1. Strengths	7
	B2. Weaknesses	7
	C. TACT Program	8
	C1. Strengths	8
	C2. Weaknesses	9
SECTION III	Program Design, Implementation, Strategy and Operation	11
	A. Overall Findings	11
	B. Monitoring and Evaluation Component	15
	C. CAAHT Program	16
	C1. Strengths	16
	C2. Weaknesses	18
	D. TACT Program	19
	D1. Strengths	19
	D2. Weaknesses	20
SECTION IV	Coordination and Collaboration with the GOA, Donors and NGOs	24
	A. Overall Findings	24
	B. CAAHT Program	25
	B1. Strengths	25
	B2. Weaknesses	25
	C. TACT Program	25
	C1. Strengths	26
	C2. Weaknesses	26
SECTION V	USAID: Internal and External Coordination	27
SECTION VI	Looking Forward: Issues and Recommendations	29
	A. General Issues and Recommendations	29
	B. Specific Issues and Recommendations	32
	B1. CAAHT Program	32
	B2. TACT Program	33
ANNEX A	Bibliography	34
ANNEX B	Organizations Consulted – Interviews and Focus Group Discussions	36

## Acknowledgements

This evaluation was commissioned by the USAID mission in Albania and funded by the EGAT/WID office of USAID. Our thanks to both offices for initiating the evaluation and providing the requisite support to undertake this work. In particular, Harry Birnholz (USAID Mission Director), Arian Giantris (Anti-Trafficking Advisor) and Besiana Kadare (Anti-Trafficking Specialist) were actively involved in the evaluation phase and provided helpful insight and assistance as well as inputs into the draft report. Thanks also to Chemonics International – in particular Teresa Cannady, Rebecca Mischel and Katrina Olemoiyoi – which commissioned the consultants and assisted with logistical support and inputs into the report. The Women’s Legal Rights Initiative (WLRI) in Albania, namely Emira Shkurti and Manjola Orgocka, provided logistical support. Finally, thanks to Stephen Warnath, Executive Director of the Nexus Institute to Combat Human Trafficking, who kindly reviewed the draft report and assisted with suggestions.

In the course of fieldwork, many different organizations contributed their time and assistance. Thanks to the staff of Terre des hommes’ TACT program and Creative Associates’ CAAHT program who provided valuable information about their respective programs as well as facilitated access to program partners, grantees and beneficiaries. In addition, many representatives from the Government of Albania, international organizations (IOs), donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) met with the evaluation team and contributed with their views and experiences. Some organizations were particularly helpful in terms of facilitating access to and organizing focus group discussions or meetings with beneficiaries. Special thanks to IGAP, Terre des hommes (Korca) and CAAHT.

Finally, the consultants would like to thank members of the evaluation team – Eri Shkurti (driver) and Julian Hasa (interpreter) – for their assistance, professional conduct and kindness throughout the fieldwork period.

Susan Somach and Rebecca Surtees  
Consultants

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

ARSIS	Association for the Social Support of Youth
AT	Anti-trafficking
AVR	Assisted Voluntary Return
BKTF	Bashke Kunder Trafikut te Femijeve
CA	Creative Associates
CAAHT	Coordinated Action Against Human Trafficking
CAII	Creative Associates International, Inc.
CCF	Christian Children Fund
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
GO	Governmental Organization
GOA	Government of Albania
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
ICMC	International Catholic Migration Commission
IGAP	Institute of Gender Applied Policies
IOM	International Office of Migration
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOLSA	Ministry Of Labor and Social Affairs
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSI	Management Systems International
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NAAC	National Albanian American Council
NPA	National Plan of Action
NRC	National Reception Center
OPDAT	Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PMP	Performance Monitoring Plan
PSHM	Partneri Shqiptar per Mikrokredi
RCG	Regional Cluster Group
SDC	Swiss Development Cooperation
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SO	Strategic Objective
SOW	Scope of Work
TA	Technical Assistance
TACT	Transnational Action against Child Trafficking
Tdh	Terre des hommes
TIP	Trafficking in Persons
TRG	Training Resources Group, Inc.
UAM	UnAcompanied Minors
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VoT	Victim of Trafficking
WLRI	Women’s Legal Rights Initiative
YWCA	Young Women’s Christian Association

## Executive Summary

This evaluation was requested by USAID/Albania in the context of developing its multi-year country strategy on anti-trafficking, with particular focus on the two existing anti-trafficking projects commenced in 2003 and coming to a close in 2006. These are: *The Albanian Initiative: Coordinated Action Against Human Trafficking (CAAHT)*, a three-year \$4.5million contract with Creative Associates International Inc. (CAII); and *Transnational Action against Child Trafficking (TACT)*, a three-year \$1.7million cooperative agreement implemented by the Swiss NGO, Terre des hommes (Tdh) with the support of six donors. The evaluation was comprised of three stages: 1) literature review and fieldwork preparation; 2) fieldwork in-country; and 3) report preparation. The evaluation was not designed as research: thus, the result is an analytical evaluation rather than a precise measure of program impact. As the objective of the evaluation was not to assess the current trafficking situation in Albania, it does not present new findings in terms of how trafficking occurs within and from the country.

In terms of USAID/Albania's anti-trafficking (AT) programs, the main overall program impacts have been (i) the infusion of funds and attention to AT efforts, (ii) the focus on government involvement in AT work at the national and local level, (iii) strengthened civil society on AT and associated issues, and (iv) a highlighted importance of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) on program work. Program impact has been limited, to varying degrees, by aspects of the M&E systems and gaps in strategic coordination among TACT, CAAHT and existing networks.

### Program Impact:

#### CAAHT Program

##### Strengths:

- Engagement of local and national government in AT efforts
- Connection and cooperation between grantees, including joint projects
- Institutional capacity building to Phase Three grantees
- Wide dispersion of funds to NGOs throughout country

##### Weaknesses:

- Slow start and delayed grant process
- Limited grant period and no planned renewals and/or no cost extensions
- Limited technical expertise on trafficking with CAAHT

#### TACT Program

##### Strengths:

- Increased political attention to child trafficking at national and international level, including through BKTF
- Existing network of partners on combating child trafficking in Albania
- Facilitated bilateral cooperation between child trafficking NGOs and government in Greece and Albania
- Establishment of referral and protection mechanisms with NGO partners

##### Weaknesses:

- Reintegration without adequate family and security assessment

- Six months as ‘successful reintegration’ means limited monitoring in spite of continued vulnerability

## **Program Design, Implementation, Strategy and Operations:**

### **Overall Findings**

- ❖ Need for standardization of case management, including development of protocols
- ❖ Inadequate attention to the professionalization of government and NGO service providers.
- ❖ Need for staff training and professional skills development within CAAHT and TACT
- ❖ Overall lack of baseline data against which to measure program results and impact
- ❖ Inadequate outreach to minority community organizations and leaders
- ❖ Need for attention and adjustment to the Monitoring and Evaluation Component

### **CAAHT Program**

#### Strengths:

- Inclusion of a wide range of stakeholders in the development and implementation of program
- Rationalization and transparency of grants application procedures and effective outreach
- Geographical distribution of activities and grants
- Donor coordination in awarding grants, although discomfort with mechanism

#### Weaknesses:

- Limited technical inputs and mentoring through grantee’s project design and implementation  
Questions about strategic selection in terms of grantees
- No assessment of capacity building needs of Phase One and Phase Two Grantees
- Awareness-raising not based on systematic knowledge of target audience or knowledge base

### **TACT Program**

#### Strengths:

- Proactive and holistic consideration of vulnerable children beyond child victims of trafficking
- Standard ID file for child beneficiaries
- International network and attention to transnational cooperation
- Focused on sustainable civil society capacity and partnerships
- Role of outreach workers in terms of prevention and protection

#### Weaknesses:

- Lack of clear definitions and categories (i.e. ‘services’, ‘reintegration’, ‘at risk’)
- Institutional bias against alternative care options
- Appropriateness of prevention programs
- Provision of material assistance and limited attention to community development

## **Coordination and Collaboration with Albanian Government, Donors and NGOs:**

### **Overall Findings:**

- ❖ Information sharing vs. collaboration
- ❖ Lack of action-oriented results within coordination meetings/mechanisms
- ❖ Lack of strategic coordination between TACT and CAAHT programs (i.e. prevention, referrals, duplication, regional working groups)
- ❖ Need to explore other avenues of coordination (International Consortium Meetings, IOs )

## **CAAHT Program**

### Strengths:

- Outreach to NGOs across the country and inclusiveness in activities
- Direct work and interaction with local government through working groups and grantees

### Weaknesses:

- More attention needed to mobilize ownership of the issue and actions by local government actors

## **TACT Program**

### Strengths:

- Long standing, reliable partnerships including some government actors
- Member of and support to BKTF
- Working with different donors

### Weaknesses:

- Limited success in mobilizing social workers in outreach and service provision
- Inadequate attention in the past to government collaboration

**USAID: Internal and External Coordination.** Moving toward a successful exit strategy and sustainable AT efforts will require greater coordination within USAID, among all USG programs, and donors and IOs. Recommendations include greater coordination and information sharing within USAID: Democracy and Governance, Economic Growth, and Health. Additional attention should be paid to developing lines of communication between civil society and government. Other USG activities, i.e., the Democracy Commission, OPDAT and ICITA, have AT activities that could be more closely connected in terms of information-sharing and cooperation. USAID may also need to consider taking on an advocacy role with other AT donors to maintain support for AT activities, and coordinating more closely with donors working in the social sector.

## **Looking Forward – Issues and Recommendations**

- ❖ Addressing trafficking within the framework of social protection
- ❖ Sustainability of trafficking efforts as well as an effective exit strategy
- ❖ Urgent need for development of case management protocols as well as standards of care
- ❖ Further strengthening and tailoring of M&E efforts
- ❖ Need for increased coordination between AT organizations and programs
- ❖ Increased attention is needed to Roma and Egyptian minorities in AT efforts
- ❖ Consider possibility of other forms of trafficking and profiles of victims in future programs
- ❖ Implications of withdrawing funds, given USAID's prominence as AT donor in Albania

### **CAAHT Program:**

- AT technical expertise
- Issues of quality control in terms of implementing grants
- Successful exit strategy and sustainability including sustainability of government and NGOs

### **TACT Program:**

- Sustainability and localization
- Standardization of definitions, standards and protocols
- Coordination with BKTF

## SECTION I

---

### Background and Methodology

#### A. Background

At the request of USAID/Albania, an evaluation was conducted on the Mission's current anti-trafficking programs in Albania<sup>1</sup> through the anti-trafficking technical assistance task order. This task order is managed by Chemonics International Inc. as a holder of the Women in Development Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC), which is funded through the EGAT/WID office. The assessment team consisted of two international consultants, Susan Somach and Rebecca Surtees, and one Albanian consultant/interpreter, Julian Hasa.

The evaluation was requested as USAID/Albania is currently in the process of developing a multi-year country strategy that will guide the Mission's programs on anti-trafficking. Of central interest were the two existing anti-trafficking projects – both within the Special Initiatives portion of the mission portfolio – which began their activities in 2003 and will come to a close in 2006. These are:

1. *The Albanian Initiative: Coordinated Action Against Human Trafficking (CAAHT) (contract no. 182-C-00-03-00109-00 with Creative Associates International Inc. (CAII) which is a three year \$4.5million Albanian Initiative.*

The CAAHT aims to provide a mechanism for increased cooperation among anti-trafficking NGOs, local government representatives and donors to reduce the number of trafficked persons in Albania and increase the number of victims successfully reintegrated into their communities. Accomplishing these objectives involves systematically increasing the capacity of local groups to combat the incidence and effects of trafficking, while facilitating increased collaboration among the NGO, donor and government communities. The three key project components are: 1) Coordinating (on national, district and local levels) the GOA, civil society, and international stakeholders to improve programs that discourage trafficking, assist and reintegrate the victims, and reduce re-trafficking; 2) Strengthening the quality and geographic spread of prevention programs and victim assistance and reintegration services through the provision of grants; and 3) Consolidating data collection and analysis to improve programs to decrease trafficking, reducing re-trafficking, and improve services that assist and reintegrate the victims.

2. *Transnational Action against Child Trafficking (TACT), a three year \$1.7million cooperative agreement (No. 182-A-00-03-00103-00) being implemented by the Swiss NGO, Terre des hommes (Tdh) with the support of six donors of which USAID is the largest.*

Tdh is currently implementing the TACT project with core funding from USAID and five additional donors (UNICEF, SIDA, the National Albanian American Council (NAAC), the Oak

---

<sup>1</sup> Albania is defined as a source country primarily for women and girls trafficked for sexual exploitation to EU countries. As well, children, especially from the Roma and Egyptian communities, are trafficked internally and internationally for begging and labor. The U.S. State Department's 2005 Trafficking in Persons Report characterized Albania as a Tier 2 country, which describes a country that doesn't fully comply but is making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with the standards of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 2000. For more information on the background of trafficking from Albania, please see *Background* section of Annex A.

Foundation, and Tdh). TACT is focused on the identification of children at-risk of being trafficked; awareness raising on child trafficking among children and communities; prevention of trafficking through provision of social and educational assistance to marginalized children and families in need; the assisted voluntary return and reintegration of children who have been trafficked to neighboring countries (primarily Greece and Italy); coordination with the GOA and local NGOs, and particularly, their empowerment at the advocacy level; and the ongoing monitoring of cases and trends in child trafficking. A key component of the USAID and Tdh project is its transnational and bilateral approach, which encourages collaboration of anti-trafficking efforts within Albania and across its borders.

## **B. Scope of work<sup>2</sup>**

At this stage of its anti-trafficking work, the Albania mission sought to evaluate the effectiveness of the anti-trafficking activities carried out by CAII and Tdh in combating trafficking in persons within the framework of their stated objectives. Also central was identifying future activities that the Mission should consider implementing following the completion of the TACT and CAAHT activities. In this regard, the evaluation focused on:

1. Program impact;
2. Overall program design, implementation, strategy and operation;
3. Collaboration with the Albanian Government, international donors, local and international NGOs;
4. Lessons learned and practical recommendations for performance improvement and strategic planning.

This evaluation was intended to review the lessons learned to more effectively achieve results, determine whether the Mission should continue its efforts against trafficking through ongoing support and extended programming of the current activities/strategies, and/or to develop a new approach or approaches to the issue. Although all aspects regarding CAAHT's and TACT's objectives, operations and results were of interest in the context of this evaluation, particular aspects were targeted for analysis, identification of lessons learned, and formulation of practical recommendations of the next steps by the Mission and the respective projects.

The evaluation team was comprised of two international consultants (Susan Somach and Rebecca Surtees) and one national consultant/interpreter (Julian Hasa). Susan Somach, the team leader, has wide ranging experience in gender and development issues, particularly in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia region and in program planning and conducting USAID assessments/evaluations. Rebecca Surtees has extensive experience in anti-trafficking efforts in SE Europe and SE Asia, in terms of program design, implementation and management; research; and assessments/evaluations. Julian Hasa, with experience in development issues in Albania, worked as team interpreter and assisted in arranging meetings. Fieldwork was undertaken between October 30 and November 21, 2005. One consultant was in-country for three weeks of fieldwork; the second consultant was in-country for two weeks due to scheduling conflicts.

---

<sup>2</sup> One modification from the original scope of work was that the Italy component of TACT's work was no longer being pursued due to internal issues within Tdh. As such, no partners in Italy were contacted as part of the evaluation. However, the team contacted by phone Tdh's partner in Thessaloniki, Greece, the NGO ARSIS.

## C. Evaluation Methodology and Workplan

The evaluation was comprised of three stages: 1) literature review and fieldwork preparation; 2) fieldwork in-country; and 3) report preparation.

### 1. Literature review and fieldwork preparation

Prior to the commencement of field work in Albania, the team reviewed pertinent literature and documents. This included TACT and CAAHT reports, USAID reports and various materials from anti-trafficking organizations. For a complete list of resources consulted, see Annex B: Bibliography. As importantly, preparation was undertaken for the field research. In close collaboration with the USAID mission in Albania, the team identified organizations and individuals to interview and the information needed to complete the assignment. In-country travel and site visits were arranged in coordination with USAID Mission priorities and inputs, balancing the need for an assessment of activities in Tirana and field-based operations.

### 2. Fieldwork in-country

On the first day in-country, the team met with mission personnel to discuss the evaluation context and deliverables associated with the Scope of Work (SOW). During field work, interviews were conducted with personnel from various governmental agencies, international organizations (IOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other relevant actors. The team interviewed over 50 organizations involved in anti-trafficking efforts in eight locations around Albania, including Tirana, Shkodra, Linza, Lezha, Pogradec, Korca, Elbasan and Puka. While the team met with government representatives at the local level, limited time and conflicting schedules meant that it was not possible to meet with representatives at the national level.<sup>3</sup>

Three methodologies were employed in the course of fieldwork:

- ***Interviews with key stakeholders***
  - Interviews were conducted according to questions outlined in the scope of work and developed jointly by the evaluation team, generally 1.5 hours in length;
  - Respondents included government representatives, donors, NGOs and international organizations.
- ***Group Discussions with stakeholders and beneficiaries***
  - Organized, facilitated discussions, generally one and a half to two hours in length, were held to ascertain in-depth information from different participants;
  - Combinations of participants included: different partner NGOs in one area (i.e. three CAAHT partners in Pogradec, three organizations cooperating on CAAHT program in Shkodra); multiple staff from one program (i.e. Tdh staff in Korca and Tirana, CAAHT staff, Ruga Me Pisha); BKTF coalition members; and program beneficiaries of TACT and CAAHT (i.e. school psychologists involved in TACT program in Korca, TACT beneficiary families in Korca, beneficiaries of IGAP prevention program in Lezha).
- ***Participant Observation***
  - Observed various activities of the two programs, undertaken as part of their daily work;

---

<sup>3</sup> Information on the activities of the national government was provided by USAID anti-trafficking staff as well as a meeting with an international advisor to the government's Ministry of the Interior, Michael Robinson.

- This included: Regional Cluster Group (RCG) meeting in Korca (facilitated by CAAHT and attended by TACT staff); CAAHT training of Phase Three grantees; signing of grants agreement of CAAHT Phase Three grantee, BKTF meeting with UN Special Rapporteur on the sale of children.

Upon completion of field research, a power-point debrief was conducted for the USAID mission and TACT and CAAHT program staff. The presentation considered the three main areas in the scope of work as well as preliminary recommendations for the Mission in going forward.

### **3. Report preparation**

The evaluation team jointly developed the report framework and drafting tasks were divided between team members. The report presents the findings of the assessment in the three main areas outlined in the scope of work as well as analysis and programming recommendations. Inputs into the draft were provided by the USAID mission in Albania, Chemonics International and the Nexus Institute to Combat Human Trafficking.

### **D. Limitations**

- Access to information and data was limited to donor reports from both TACT and CAAHT programs, general background information on trafficking and interviews and group discussions with different stakeholders;
- The mandate was to consider all stakeholders involved in anti-trafficking activities in Albania, not only CAAHT and TACT staff, as a means to examine the programs from different perspectives. While all CAAHT and TACT staff was met on more than one occasion, more time with individual staff would have been helpful.
- Due to time limitations in the field, not all sites could be visited, although site visits were made to as wide a reach of organizations as was possible. Fieldwork was conducted within a set time period between October 30 and November 21, 2005;
- The scope of work was very comprehensive and sought to answer a wide range of issues. As such, the questions included were used as guidelines rather than answering each question individually. Responses to questions are embedded in broader thematic points;
- The evaluation was not designed as research, which necessarily limits the ability to evaluate impact systematically. As such, the result is an analytical evaluation rather than a precise measure of program impact;
- The objective of the evaluation was not to assess the current trafficking situation in Albania and, therefore, does not present new findings in terms of how trafficking occurs within and from the country. Other research considers this topic,<sup>4</sup> some of which are listed in the bibliography.

---

<sup>4</sup> However, it is clear from interviews and available data that there has been little research which specifically considers and assesses these allegedly new trafficking patterns and trends. Many sources referred to increased internal trafficking for prostitution and forced begging. However, no studies have specifically looked at these issues, constituting a gap in information and understanding.

## SECTION II

---

### Program Impact

#### A. Overall Findings

In evaluating the program impact of USAID/Albania's anti-trafficking (AT) programs, the main overall program impact has been (i) the infusion of funds and attention to AT efforts, (ii) the focus on government involvement in AT work at the national and local level, (iii) strengthened civil society on AT and associated issues, and (iv) a highlighted importance of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) on program work.

#### **Infusion of funds and attention to the trafficking issue**

The large investment drew attention to the issue and by implication, signaled USAID's advocacy on the issue, consistent with the annual TIP reporting process of the Department of State. Between the two programs (CAAHT and TACT), \$6.2 million dollars was channeled to anti-trafficking efforts in Albania during the 3 year period between 2003 and 2006. Of the \$4.5 million CAAHT funding, a total of \$2,112,280 will be distributed through 23 grants to local and international NGOs working on the issue. The funding has allowed for new projects to be implemented and for the continuation of existing successful projects that were otherwise not likely to be funded. In particular, organizations in under-served areas outside of Tirana have been funded, including CAAHT's grantees in the north and TACT's expansion of Tdh's long-standing AT work in the southeast to the cities of Durres, Fier, and Berat. The TACT funding also allowed Tdh staff to dedicate a portion of their time to the BKTF coalition.

#### **Focus on government involvement in anti-trafficking work – at national and local level**

The TACT program resulted in increased movement toward operational relationship with government entities, and has MOUs with the Ministry of Public Order and the former Ministry of Social Affairs. At the local level there is a long tradition of cooperation, albeit with limited success with social workers. TACT started social work training in May 2005 that included government and NGO partners. Among the more active areas of government involvement is the Elbasan working group. Plans are underway for some type of Tdh staff secondment, support or advice to the social services offices in Pogradec and Gramsh. TACT-supported BKTF advocacy has pressured and engaged the GOA on child trafficking issues. For example, when the UK wanted a readmission agreement for UAMs, it was BKTF who did the substantive revision to the agreement that also required the UK government to deal directly with the GOA.

The CAAHT program has increased government involvement through the formation of Regional Cluster Groups (RCGs), the introduction of the national strategy for government-NGO cooperation at the local level, and MOUs by grantees with the local government where they are working. CAAHT is among few donor-driven programs that have pushed NGO grantees to work with government, raising the GOA's awareness of and engagement on the issue.

#### **Strengthened civil society on anti-trafficking and associated issues**

The CAAHT program is strengthening targeted areas of civil society through direct organizational capacity building by ANTTARC for Phase Three grantees, including project management, financial management, organizational development, and advocacy, and through financial management and M&E training for all grantees. The CAAHT approach toward giving grants has been comprehensive,

covering outreach, and workshop on grants management, M&E and financial management. In addition, the targeting of weaker NGOs in Phase Three has extended the reach beyond the stronger Tirana-based organizations. TACT expanded the Tdh network to new areas, and strengthened the targeted and strategic cooperation and support with a few NGOs – NPF and ARSIS – including the aspect of transnational civil society support. As noted above, training on social work included their NGO partners, increasing their technical capacity to engage with government in social services. In addition, the support to BKTF provided increased opportunities for NGOs to work in coalition.

### **Highlighted the importance of M&E in program work**

Both anti-trafficking programs raised the prominence of M&E for both government entities and NGOs working on development programs. Thus, they recognized the importance of measurable results to the work they are doing. M&E provides the basis for accurate reporting and possibility to make adjustments to programs as the situation changes. Funding was made available for specialists in both programs and professional expertise was provided by USAID in developing the anti-trafficking PMP.

### **Limitations:**

Program impact has been limited, to varying degrees, by aspects of the M&E systems and the gaps in strategic coordination among TACT, CAAHT and existing networks.

### **M&E systems**

The M&E system is quite extensive, yet focuses heavily on quantitative indicators without adequate attention to qualitative indicators. For example, change in awareness of trafficking is measured, but this is not enough to guarantee the necessary change in behavior. In addition, measuring the number of statements on trafficking by the Albanian government does not indicate what happens as a result. The M&E system should also have periodic review and adjustment to reflect changed trends. Such a review can also adjust certain indicators that do not adequately measure results, are not appropriate relative to changed patterns of TIP, and/or take too much time of staff relative to their usefulness. See discussion on *Monitoring & Evaluation* in the *Program Design, Implementation Strategy and Operation* section.

### **Lack of strategic coordination**

For a variety of reasons, there was a lack of strategic coordination between TACT and CAAHT. The result has been some overlap in the provision of services in Korca, confusion about the role of their respective working groups,<sup>5</sup> and a missed opportunity to maximize program impact. The lack of strategic coordination of the AT programs with existing networks, i.e. women’s networks, human rights, etc, has been a missed opportunity to fortify the capacity and presence of existing organizations as funding is shrinking and future AT funding is in question. Failing to actively consider the existing networks signals the excessive focus on AT rather than the natural links between the various issues – i.e. domestic violence, minority rights, social protection, etc. These “natural allies” also form a needed link to sustainability.

## **B. CAAHT Program**

---

<sup>5</sup> Although both CAAHT and TACT identified their working groups as serving different functions – policy and operations – there is substantial overlap, especially as the CAAHT “policy” RCGs move to the *qarku* level where operational coordination is more likely to happen. Further, strategically, it is not advisable to make the divide between policy and operational aspects of AT work as these are mutually reinforcing and co-terminous.

## **B1. Strengths**

### **Engagement of local and national government in AT efforts**

The CAAHT program was specifically designed to include engagement of government at all levels in AT activities. As such, it was among the first to meaningfully engage with the GOA on these issues. CAAHT established and managed RCGs to bring together NGO and local government actors for coordinated action.

### **Connection and cooperation between grantees, including joint projects**

CAAHT has promoted on-going cooperation among grantees for the three grant rounds. Phase One and Two grantees participated and shared their experience and technical expertise during the initial AT training for Phase Three grantees. Another positive aspect of the grant program was the emergence of joint projects, such as the ones in Shkodra and Pogradec, where several NGOs are working together. As well, grantees report working partnerships resulting from CAAHT activities – a link between Vatra in Vlora and the community centre in Gjirokastra.

### **Institutional capacity building to Phase Three grantees**

Acknowledging the weakness in the capacity of Phase Three grantees, CAAHT has contracted for ANTTARC to provide substantial training in capacity building with four 2-4 day trainings. Each of the Phase Three grantees will also be provided with 20 days of on-site TA on institutional capacity building to be individually tailored to the needs of the grantee organization.

### **Wide dispersion of funds to NGOs throughout country**

CAAHT has funded grantees with activities throughout the country, including a focus on the north where Tdh has not worked and where other donors had not concentrated funds. Phase Three grants were specifically targeted to NGOs that were based in, or had field offices in the underserved *qarkus* such as Dibra, Shkodra, Puka, Kukes, Berati, and Gjirokastra.

## **B2. Weaknesses**

### **Slow start and delayed grant process**

The CAAHT program was delayed due to difficulties securing a COP, thus getting off to a slow start, and CAII's failure to complete deliverables in its first year of implementation. The grant process was further delayed awaiting a policy clarification by USAID. As a result, CAAHT did not begin awarding grants until January 2005, nearly 16 months after the umbrella contract was signed between USAID/Albania and Creative Associates International, Inc. (CAII) in September 2003. The delay resulted in a collapsing of the grant process into overlapping rounds and a limited time frame for establishment of RCGs.

### **Limited grant period and no planned renewals and/or no cost extensions**

The one-year grant period is too short to expect significant measurable impact on the complex problem of trafficking in persons. All Phase Three grants have a maximum 10-month period due to contracting delays and CAAHT's need for two months to prepare final reporting, M&E and other closeout activities. It is unclear who is/was primarily responsible for the delays, but such delays necessarily have a detrimental effect on program impact. Moreover, CAAHT has acknowledged that no-cost extensions are possible, yet partners have not been universally informed of this option. Going

forward, no cost extension options should be both explained and explored; the same for the possibility of grant renewals for successful projects.

### **Limited technical expertise on trafficking with CAAHT**

The CAAHT staff has limited experience and technical expertise on trafficking. While this was largely the result of program design and implementation (see subsequent section for detail), the lack of AT expertise limited the ability of CAAHT staff to evaluate proposals for technical merit and limited the AT program design and implementation assistance that CAAHT could offer grantees.

Overall there has been a limited investment of time and money by CAII management in building the AT expertise of the CAAHT staff. CAAHT staff have not been sent to TIP conferences or training, and have not been participants in CAAHT workshops, all of which could help build their AT capacity. As well, technical assistance on AT was not made a responsibility for staff working directly with grantees.

Quality control is an important aspect of NGO strengthening programs such as CAAHT. AT interventions need to be checked for quality and appropriateness for target audiences so as to prevent the possibility of limited or even negative program impact. Because of limited technical expertise, inputs were not provided and quality control not systematically undertaken, limiting programs results. Further, mechanisms for quality control identify good programs to be continued; further strengthen positive programs; and replicate effective strategies. This constitutes a missed opportunity to build the capacity of grantees as well as to build the capacity of CAAHT staff to serve as trafficking experts, which, in and of itself, could be read as a sustainable programmatic impact. Greater technical expertise affords CAAHT staff an authoritative voice on the issue, which, in turn, enhances their work.

## **C. TACT Program**

### **C1. Strengths:**

#### **Increased political attention to child trafficking at national and international level, including through BKTF**

The TACT program has continued to increase the political attention on child trafficking through its ongoing advocacy work that supplements its operational focus. Directly and through the BKTF coalition of 13 member organizations, TACT has advocated on both the national and international level, i.e., work on the Greek and UK readmission agreements; monitoring during the Olympic Games; and the establishment and enforcement of a child protection system in Albania. As a result, significant progress has been made in enshrining the UN's "best interest of the child" principle in several GOA policies, i.e., the National Strategy for the Fight Against Child Trafficking and the draft cooperation agreement to establish a National Referral Mechanism and the draft bilateral agreement with Greece for the safe return of unaccompanied minors.

#### **Existing network of partners on combating child trafficking in Albania**

TACT has a well-developed network of partners and offices with broad geographic reach for responding to child trafficking in Albania and of Albanian children in Greece. The TACT 3 proposal includes plans to expand into new areas (i.e. Tirana).

## **Facilitated bilateral cooperation between child trafficking NGOs and government in Greece and Albania**

The program was particularly active in advocacy efforts through BKTF regarding the readmission agreement between Albania and Greece. At the operational level, the TACT program has facilitated bilateral cooperation between Greece and Albania on cases of child trafficking and deportation cases through its Greek NGO partner ARSIS. TACT and ARSIS have extensive operational cooperation working with child returnees, including assisting deportees traveling with and without their parents.

### **Establishment of referral and protection mechanisms with NGO partners**

The TACT program has established referral and protection mechanisms with NGO partners through their own network and BKTF. The network is operational with experience on AVR. TACT pays particular attention to child rights within referral and protection, something that has not been seriously considered in the past in Albania. TACT has played a role in ensuring children's specific needs are considered in case handling- i.e. child focused interviewing, the presence of social workers and/or psychologists in interviews – although there are questions about the reintegration process, as noted below.

## **C2. Weaknesses**

### **Reintegration without adequate family and security assessment**

TACT<sup>6</sup> has not institutionalized an adequate family and security assessment protocol for use before family reintegration.<sup>7</sup> TACT staff acknowledged that the family and security assessment is mostly intuitive and based on previous interaction with family members. This approach, with a lack of protocols for the assessment, does not ensure that the child will not be returned to a potentially risky situation. This issue has particular resonance in light of recent child trafficking trends whereby the majority of children are being trafficked by their families.<sup>8</sup> Questions need to be asked about whether this puts some children at continued risk and/or leads to re-trafficking. Examples of protocols for child reintegration from Bulgaria could serve as a reference point for Tdh to develop its own security and family assessment protocols.<sup>9</sup>

The TACT staff did report cases where referrals were made to shelters or foster/shelter families, but only on rare occasions. The evaluation team acknowledges the limitation for alternative care options in Albania and the challenges of timing with short notification period before returned children appear at the border. Nevertheless, the TACT staff does have the option of referring children temporarily to some shelter facilities (i.e. Tjeter Visions, National Reception Centre (NRC), etc.) during the time

<sup>6</sup> The bias toward family reunification seems to be consistent with the attitude of ARSIS Thessaloniki staff who noted that the reintegration is designed to create the responsibility for the family, and the families may find it "easier" to have the child placed elsewhere. The staff also expressed that the reunification is often the expressed choice of the children who want to go back to their families because it's the only environment they have known. Their approach is to give the parents who have been involved with the trafficking "time to think about what they did" and to monitor them daily.

<sup>7</sup> In addition to criteria to assess risk both within community and family, protocols can also provide techniques for effective assessments such as interviewing family members separately, checking with teachers and classmates/friends, discussions with community members and leaders, etc. Power dynamics within communities also impact vulnerability.

<sup>8</sup> Even where parents were not overtly complicit, there are issues in terms of reintegration. Traffickers may seek to re-traffick these victims and families may be without the power to stop them. One Albanian boy explained of his return: "When I came home I did not feel really welcome. They (the parents) already knew that I had escaped from the exploiter. He called them and threatened them, asking them to give back the money he had spent on my trip to Greece if I did not go back. My father was angry because he could not see a way to pay him back" (ILO-IPEC 2003a: 32).

<sup>9</sup> Family and security assessments are a requisite component of the return of all Bulgarian minors from abroad, anticipating some of the problems of return to family in such circumstances. These recently implemented mechanisms should identify where there has been family involvement in trafficking and develop a reintegration plan for the minor that takes these risks into account. Such mechanisms may be helpful in developing tools for Albania.

when the family and security assessment is being properly being conducted. Moreover, TACT also could further develop alternative options to shelter models like the NRC. Alternative care options are discussed in more detail in the subsequent section.

**Six months as ‘successful reintegration’ means limited monitoring in spite of continued vulnerability**

The length of time identified as “successful reintegration” varies by TACT office, in some cases referring to three months in school and in others two years or more. The choice of time appears to be arbitrary, and is inconsistent with other agencies/countries. The risk of the shorter periods of time is that the level of monitoring drops once the reintegration is “successful,” thus increasing the risk that a child with continued vulnerability will not receive the necessary support to avoid further harm. See discussion below in Program Design, Implementation Strategy and Operation.

## SECTION III

---

### Program Design, Implementation, Strategy and Operations

USAID/Albania's anti-trafficking program is one of the largest and most comprehensive bilateral programs in the Agency. It builds on USAID/Albania's anti-trafficking efforts over the past three years and is primarily concentrated in the areas of prevention and re-integration. Currently, USAID/Albania's program has two primary activities: CAAHT is focused more generally on the trafficking of women and children and TACT is specifically targeting child trafficking. The two projects were designed differently as well as undertake distinct activities.

The CAAHT project was developed following an independent consultative assessment, a workshop with stakeholders to gather recommendations and input to the Mission on its anti-trafficking activities, and a competed RFP from potential contractors.<sup>10</sup> By contrast, the TACT proposal was an unsolicited proposal and awarded as a cooperative agreement based on the evidence and proposal of Terre des hommes<sup>11</sup> regarding the scope of the child trafficking problem and their project's method of responding to the issue. Both programs have different design structures, but tend to measure similar components such as prevention, reintegration and coordination. Further, both are focused on addressing the issue of trafficking from a victim's and/or child's rights perspective.

Both programs have important strengths in terms of their design, implementation and operation, manifested in the positive program impacts discussed above. However, there are aspects of both CAAHT's and TACT's design and implementation that could be revised toward more effective program impact. Overall findings in this regard include the following issues, as outlined below.

#### A. Overall Findings

##### **Need for standardization of case management, including development of protocols**

Standardized case management is essential in the provision of victim services, to ensure quality of care throughout the country and across different agencies, whether government or non-governmental. These standards of care are particularly important given the increased involvement of government departments in service provision and given that transferring responsibility and skills to government is an essential step in sustainability and government ownership. The establishment of these standards is also vital if such programs are to serve as a positive example of USAID's AT work and with the intended replication of program strategy under TACT to neighboring countries/regions such as Romania, Moldova and the province of Kosovo.

While some organizations have developed case management tools, they are not standardized and do not have accompanying guidelines and protocols for implementation. For example, TACT maintains

---

<sup>10</sup> In February 2003, USAID funded a consultant to conduct an assessment of the anti-trafficking programs and efforts being carried out in Albania, outlining accomplishments and areas of needs. Building upon this assessment, USAID/Albania held an Anti-Trafficking Workshop in February 2003 to better address the growing desire for a unified and collaborative approach to working against trafficking in Albania. The workshop brought together international and local organizations, practitioners, and policy makers involved in combating trafficking and assisting victims in Albania and provided them with an opportunity to discuss and share their experiences. The aim was to identify best practices in prevention and reintegration of children, women and girls; develop strategies to improve information management; and identify research needs. The outcome was a day of concrete discussions and recommendations with which USAID/Albania developed a scope of work for an umbrella contract, ultimately awarded to CAII, to implement the Albania Initiative: Coordinated Action Against Human Trafficking.

<sup>11</sup> Terre des hommes has had an on-going presence in Albania since 1997 and commenced its work to combat child trafficking in 1999.

an ID file for each assisted beneficiary. However, there appears to be varied capacity in terms of case management skills between Tdh offices and different staff members. Further, there are no standard regulations for how cases are handled – i.e. when cases are ‘frozen’ or ‘closed’, how long case are to be followed and what constitutes ‘full reintegration’. As well, in spite of its participation within the BKTF coalition, Tdh has not been successful in encouraging the widespread use of standardized ID files by BKTF coalition partners. Similarly, service providers funded by CAAHT, such as Different and Equal and VATRA, have case management mechanisms, developed prior to working with CAAHT and the CAAHT program has not been involved in assessing and providing inputs into these procedures. Generally, existing case management mechanisms were developed individually by organizations and there has been little cross-pollination of ideas and strategies between service providers. Further, case management procedures have not been assessed by either program in terms of adherence to international standards

In the development of case management protocols as well as standards of care for trafficking victims, attention must be paid to the protection and assistance needs of different profiles of victims (male, female, adult, child, elderly, disabled, ethnic minorities) and different forms of exploitation/trafficking (labor, sexual exploitation, begging, delinquency, adoption). Also important is consideration of how needs vary according to different stages of development within childhood and adolescents. Finally, such efforts should be undertaken in close collaboration with the government, meshing with its social service reform.

### **Inadequate attention to the professionalization of government and NGO service providers**

To date, training and capacity building has been generally inadequate toward equipping service providers, such as social workers and psychologists, in effectively undertaking their work. There is a need for two types of professional training:

1. *Basic professional training for all service providers, to ensure a basic level of professional functioning in their field of expertise*

Many service providers lack basic professional training. In many organizations, social workers were teachers who had transitioned to social work without formal training. Similarly, school psychologists from the Department of Education in Korca with whom TACT plans to work were generally teachers who had been re-named psychologists without any accompanying training (Tuxhari 2005). Only one school psychologist with whom the team met had professional training in psychology. Training for service providers has generally been *ad hoc*, with little follow-up or on-going professional development. This lack of a professional skills base not only limits effectiveness but also potentially places both the professional and the victim in difficult and, arguably, dangerous situations. This basic professional training should be consistent with international standards and constitute an improvement over existing social services, which have been low functioning. The I3SP social work module, funded by CAAHT, should be reviewed to ensure that it is appropriate and reflects current social work norms as well as anti-trafficking expertise. Importantly, any professional training needs to include mapping of roles and responsibilities for social workers and service providers (NGO and GOs) within in an evolving state structure.<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> This process has been started by Tdh, which is currently conducting training for social workers in the country. There are two types of training provide – 1) for NGOs about the roles and responsibilities of government social workers, including the limitations faced by government social workers and 2) for government social service staff about the new social service standards. Currently in Albania, government social workers are not tasked with

## 2. *On-going professional development for service providers with existing skills, training and expertise*

On-going professional development was requested in different areas including forensic psychology, child psychology, social work tailored to the needs of children, trafficking tailored medical care, psychological assistance, street work methodology, etc. On-going professional development training will likely require an infusion of external expertise. Such training and support might be provided by linking universities in Albania with appropriately skilled universities abroad, facilitating access to highly skilled NGOs or government agencies from donor countries, etc. In addition to formal training, this process may include regular mentoring, exchange programs and ‘echo seminars’ through which these skills are shared within and between programs.

Professional training should be a priority area in future. And, in light of government plans for social sector reform, efforts are needed to link professional training offered to counter-trafficking actors with training to social service actors more generally. Training efforts should also proactively target government service providers, with different skills levels needed for different groups of professionals.

### **Need for staff training and professional skills development within CAAHT and TACT**

It is important to ensure that all TACT and CAAHT program staff are well trained and able to serve as a resource for NGOs, IOs and government ministries and to technically support their work, as needed. TACT and CAAHT staff also have a mentoring role to play with GO and NGO partners and grantees and on-going professional development.

The process of staff development should be on going, with tested and reliable training modules/manuals as well as on-going mentoring by management.<sup>13</sup> This should be based on updated information about trafficking in the country as well as current materials regarding anti-trafficking responses (policy and programmatic) from the region and globally. In the case of service providers particularly (i.e. TACT community animators), this might also include sessions on ‘burn out’ and stress management, which, ideally, could be replicated for government and NGO social workers. Finally, it is vital that training consciously incorporates themes that cross cut trafficking, such as gender issues, minority rights, children’s rights, gender based violence, community empowerment and social development. Inadequate attention in this arena by both programs is largely a product of program design and constitutes a missed opportunity in terms of equipping staff with skills that can be vital in combating trafficking as well as other forms of exploitation and violence.

### **Overall lack of baseline data against which to measure program results and impact**

Baseline information is an essential starting point in the design and implementation of programs and is essential to effectively measure changes, results and impact. While both programs have undertaken some basic surveying at different stages of their projects, more attention is needed in future design

---

outreach and case follow-up nor have they been trained or equipped to take on this role, constituting a gap between the work undertaken by NGOs as compared to that by GO social workers.

<sup>13</sup> This requires a careful consideration of what constitutes professional training with appropriate methodologies (as opposed to didactic lecturing) and adult learning techniques as well as professionally tailored skills development. Further, it is important to assess the training needs of the relevant CAAHT and TACT staff to ensure that any training undertaken meets their specific needs. AT training has been undertaken throughout the world and resources may be available through other USAID program which can be mobilized.

and implementation. For example, TACT undertook investigations in Greece beginning in 1999, with subsequent inquiries until May 2002 (Tdh 2003). However, there have not been follow-up surveys since to systematically assess changes in trafficking patterns and exploitation of children. Similarly, CAAHT undertook a baseline survey of NGOs working on trafficking. However, the survey was largely a quantification of the number of NGOs working in the area rather than an assessment of the quality of these programs. As well, the survey was based on 52 NGOs (33% of the 157 originally contacted) and was undertaken through self-reporting, rather than objective assessment.

In part, the lack of baseline data may be attributable to some donors' unwillingness to build surveys or research into programs. However, this may also be due to a misperception of what is needed to gather baseline data. While systematic surveys are desirable, they are not the only option. ID files of past beneficiaries provide a potential baseline against which programs can be designed and results measured. Similarly, in TACT's proposed work with school psychologists, one aspect of baseline data collection could be an assessment of staff capacity, with this information used to develop an appropriate training program. When conducting awareness-raising campaigns, it is important to know what the target audience does and does not already know as well as appropriate ways to convey information

Further, many organizations highlighted changing trafficking patterns and trends in Albania, including internal trafficking for sexual exploitation, forced begging within Albania, trafficking for labor, and trafficking by parents to maximize financial gain from their children's labor. However, no related studies have been undertaken, begging questions about the appropriateness of program changes and adjustments made without this information. Comprehensive baselines would be constructive and are likely only to be possible for large programs like CAAHT or TACT with sufficient resources. Smaller organizations and programs can benefit from such baselines collected in the design, implementation and evaluation of their programs.

### **Inadequate outreach to minority community organizations and leaders**

Minority groups are deemed among the most vulnerable to trafficking and constitute a large percentage of assisted victims of trafficking for all forms of exploitation.<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, AT efforts have not proactively engaged minority communities, including in terms of alliances with minority rights groups, good governance organizations, or community development efforts of donors such as Open Society/SOROS. As importantly, there has been a lack of sensitivity to minority issues within program design. Significant opportunities for minority staff have not been fostered, nor have partnerships with minority community groups and leadership. Program staff attribute this to the generally low educational levels within the Roma and Egyptian communities. However, working with a target group for several years affords sufficient time to build minority staff training and community engagement into program design. Further, participation need not only be at the professional level but can mobilize community participation in a range of different ways, including as volunteers, trainees, peer educators, para-professionals, etc.

---

<sup>14</sup> In Albania, the vast majority of minors trafficked for labor, begging and/or delinquency were from ethnic minorities – either Roma, Egyptian or of mix of ethnicities. In 2003, 89.5% of victims were from minorities while, in 2004, the number was 70.4% (Surtees 2005a: 52, cf. Surtees 2005b). Albanian women and girls trafficked for sexual exploitation were also drawn from ethnic minorities, although to a lesser extent than victims of trafficking for labor and begging. In 2003, 13% of victims assisted by NGO VATRA were either Roma or Egyptian and, in 2004, 14.6% of victims assisted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) were from ethnic minorities (Surtees 2005a: 52, 60, cf. VATRA 2004). Such findings are striking when one considers that only approximately 3% of the Albanian population are ethnic minorities (World Bank 2001).

AT programs can be more intentional in their work with minority communities in terms of program design and implementation based on their self-articulated rights and needs.<sup>15</sup> Attention is also needed to the specifics of trafficking within minority communities including how different social groups consume and digest prevention messages, view assistance options, access information, etc. Further, prevention efforts must go beyond awareness raising and tackle the systemic issues of socio-economic disenfranchisement.<sup>16</sup> As well, it is helpful to think beyond the category of ‘ethnicity’ and pinpoint the specifics of different ethnic groups and diversity within ethnic minority groups, not all of whom are equally vulnerable to trafficking. In challenging general social categories and situating interventions in the specifics of victim’s lives and experiences, it may be possible to identifying resiliency factors required to combat trafficking.

## **B. Monitoring and Evaluation Component**

Both programs have invested a great deal of time and expertise in the M&E component of their work and, in many ways, these are positive examples of AT M&E. There are, however, some areas within the M&E components of both programs that would benefit from some attention. These are outlined below.

### **Potentially too many indicators**

Both programs collect many indicators in their M&E system. While providing valuable data, this also uses much staff time in the design, monitoring and analysis of the data. Consideration may be needed on how to balance donor requirements (for reporting and M&E) against staff time. The current number of indicators may not be manageable, particularly when considering how M&E systems are to be transferred to NGO and GO partners in the next phase of localization. Some indicators may be less necessary toward measuring impact and results.

### **M&E information not mobilized systematically**

To date, M&E information has not generally been operationalized in program implementation and adjustment, in spite of its importance in ensuring that programs are responsive to the situation on the ground. Regularly analyzing M&E information is important. Examining protection and reintegration information (i.e. from shelter staff, community animators, etc.) is valuable in developing and modifying prevention messages; data about areas of origin help to appropriately target sensitization campaigns; information about routes are informative for law enforcement partners; forms of

---

<sup>15</sup> There are some positive examples of work with Roma communities. Amaro Drom initiates community development programs, including sports activities for Roma youth; vocational training; and advocacy within the community. For example, in one community Roma mothers lobbied against discrimination of their children by local school teacher who generally placed the Roma children at the back of the classroom. (Amaro Drom 2005). As well, the US Embassy previously funded Romani Baxt in Korca to undertake vocational training and work with local government to meet Roma needs in community. In terms of trafficking, in October 2004, a conference was held in Serbia by the Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues within the OSCE as part of its project ‘Awareness-raising for Roma Activists on the Issue of Trafficking in Human Beings’. Romani activists from SEE, including two from Albania, participated in the conference and began to explore the issue of trafficking within their communities. For a discussion of some of the points raised in the conference, please see Karoly 2005.

<sup>16</sup> Roma and Egyptian household incomes are less than half that of Albanian urban household incomes at the national level. Further, over 40 per cent of Roma families and 30 per cent of Egyptian families do not have running water in their homes, most live in makeshift or dilapidated homes and face difficulties in obtaining social assistance (Beddies et al. 2003: 15). In 2002, the national unemployment rate level was approximately 16 per cent. However, unemployment among Roma and Egyptian was far higher – 71 per cent and 67 per cent respectively of the working age population. Further, 88 per cent of Roma and 83 per cent of Egyptian were unemployed for more than one year (Beddies et al. 2003: 18). Roma attend four years of school, while Egyptians have attended an average of five years. Further, a large number of these ethnic minorities have never attended school, accounting for 62 per cent of Roma and 24 per cent of Egyptian between the ages of 7 and 20 years (Beddies et al. 2003: 100).

exploitation help in tailoring assistance; etc. Sharing this data between CAAHT and TACT and with the government can be mutually beneficial.

### **Appropriateness of existing indicators and need to adjust indicators over time**

It is important that indicators provide information needed to more effectively prevent or protect against trafficking. Indicators should measure not only the beneficiary's awareness but also resulting changes in behavior. Further, many indicators collected by both programs are more quantitative than qualitative. Both CAAHT and TACT count meeting attendance, which does not provide a sufficient measure for impact and result. Design of indicators should pay attention to qualitative requirements as well as the tangibility of results indicators. This is another area where CAAHT and TACT could work together and benefit from each other's experience.

There is also a need to make adjustments to indicators over time, considering whether what is measured is valid in the current situation. Indicators may not yield valuable results, may not be appropriate relative to changed patterns of TIP, etc. Program design should take into account the need for periodic review and adjustment of indicators to accurately capture results. Where programs increasingly attend to more generalized social protection issues, indicators should be developed to address this focus.

### **Need for pre and post testing for all programs**

All programs require pre and post testing to effectively measure impact and results, but this has not been uniformly implemented. Future CAAHT grantees and project partners should be required to include this aspect in project design. Also important is the use of the findings from pre and post tests, to assess impact and make requisite adjustments. To date, neither TACT nor CAAHT have effectively mobilized this information to tailor programs.

### **Need for strong AT indicators**

A critical gap in AT work globally is the lack of strong indicators to measure program impact. With the space afforded to both TACT and CAAHT by USAID in the area of M&E both can contribute in this area. For example, CAAHT, with a diverse pool of grantees, has the opportunity to develop, test and revise indicators and evaluation tools for a range of different types of programs, toward the development of good practices and strategies. Importantly, programs should make use of and share 'bad examples' to illuminate what does and does not work to help other USAID missions and practitioners. Programs can be creative in developing strong indicators, considering what has and has not worked in the past and make adjustments. The oversight of the regional TACT program in Budapest will serve to facilitate this development. It is also important to measure negative impacts of programs and some discussion of such indicators is warranted.<sup>17</sup> Some thought should be given to how this M&E mechanism – including good practices and lessons learned – can be sustainable beyond the life of the programs.

## **C. CAAHT Program**

### **C1. Strengths**

---

<sup>17</sup> A compelling example is the negative fall-out from some early awareness-raising campaigns in which parents were warned about the dangers of allowing their daughters to stray far from home and their vulnerability to trafficking. The end result of this tactic, however, was that fearful parents withdrew their daughters from school to protect them. Ironically, such actions may be said to increase trafficking vulnerability as uneducated women may be more predisposed to accept work offers or marriage promises because they have so few options at home due to their limited education.

### **Inclusion of a wide range of stakeholders in the development and implementation of program**

From the outset of the program, and indeed in the development of the RFP itself, attention was paid to the ideas, inputs and needs of a wide range of stakeholders. USAID consulted stakeholders (NGO, GO and IO) in the development of the program; the formal launch in May 2004 reached out to many organizations; CAAHT traveled to different locations around Albania when outreaching to potential grantees; and the CAAHT annual conference included many organizations – grantees and non-grantees, NGOs and GOs. Inclusion of government actors in the CAAHT program has been a particular strength, most visibly through regional cluster group meetings. CAAHT has also required grantees to work closely with the government and most grantees have at least one MOU with a government agency.

### **Rationalization and transparency of grants application procedures and effective outreach**

The design of the grants application procedure sought to be inclusive, including making the application process accessible to a wide range of potential grantees. CAAHT staff prepared a grants manual for potential grantees, conducted grants outreach workshops in different regions, sought to realize geographic distribution of grants and included less well-known project partners. In concrete terms, this meant that a wide range of potential programmatic responses was presented and CAAHT was able to support some creative responses, which might not otherwise have been developed.<sup>18</sup>

### **Geographical distribution of activities and grants**

The CAAHT program has comprehensive geographic coverage and, importantly, has reached areas that have been largely overlooked in the past, most notably Puka, Kukes, Shkodra and Gjirokastra. Further, efforts were made not to duplicate the work of the TACT program geographically as well as operationally. As a result, newly identified NGOs were accepted as grantees. This has allowed programs in these less considered areas to offer services and undertake prevention efforts as well as contribute to strengthened civil society.

### **Donor coordination in awarding grants, although discomfort with mechanism**

A conscious effort was made by the CAAHT program to coordinate anti-trafficking programs, encourage complementarity of efforts and avoid duplication of programs. In addition, CAAHT required NGOs to develop working agreements with local government representatives to ensure that the programs meshed with government interests and concerns. In some cases, CAAHT has also co-funded programs with other donors, such as co-funding D&E with the Dutch Embassy.

While this was a largely positive, some organizations expressed discomfort with the mechanism for coordination. NGOs applying for CAAHT funds were requested to obtain letters of support directly from other organizations working in the area. While intended to prevent duplication, in essence it meant that the organization being consulted was in the position to make decisions about CAAHT programs while not being part of the formal process. In future, CAAHT should consider other mechanisms for coordination such as contacting the organizations directly rather than requesting the applicant undertake this role. Alternatively, other organizations may be included in the grants review process (i.e. other USAID programs, government representatives, IOs, NGOs).<sup>19</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup> For example, the Albanian Foundation for Conflict Resolution works in the area of mediation with families who might resort to blood feud vendettas when family members have been trafficked. In the north of Albania, there is a link between trafficking and blood feuds. In some circumstances, blood feuds occur when a family takes revenge for the trafficking of one of its family members. In other circumstances, trafficking may be the end result of a blood feud in that the female family member must find work because it is not safe for male family members to leave the house. Women whose family is engaged in blood feuds may also be specifically targeted by traffickers for 'marriage' (CAAHT 2004: 12).

## C2. Weaknesses

### **Limited technical inputs and mentoring through grantee's project design and implementation**

While CAAHT staff provide extensive inputs into the practical aspects of grants management (i.e. finances, reporting, M&E), the staff lacks capacity to input into the more technical aspects of project design and implementation. This was due, in large part, to the limited trafficking specific expertise amongst CAAHT program staff, which can be attributed to different factors. In part, this may be due to the prioritization of certain skill sets – M&E, grants management, program management – over trafficking expertise by USAID and CAII in the hiring process. Technical skills may also have been lost as a priority given the urgency of hiring local staff after CAII's delayed start. However, lack of substantive investment in staff training toward developing this technical expertise is also a contributor.

A number of grantees expressed a desire for more substantive inputs into programs in future – in the design and implementation phase, into reports submitted – to help guide the programs in strategic ways.<sup>20</sup>

With its focus on government ownership and sustainability, the presence of expertise within CAAHT means that the government and NGOs receive technical expertise on an on-going basis. This is an important contribution to sustainable AT efforts and expertise, which should be considered as CAAHT moves forward. As such, it is important that CAII makes AT training a priority for their staff in-country in order that they are better able to serve the Mission and fulfill their contract obligations.

### **Questions about strategic selection in terms of grantees**

To some degree, the CAAHT program was strategic in identifying grantees – i.e. geographic reach, attention to weaker NGOs, etc. Further, the CAAHT program took a proactive position in terms of engaging BKTF in potential programs for CAAHT funding. However, arguably more attention might have been paid to supporting existing and complimentary networks and organizations, such as women's NGOs, GBV service providers, minority organizations, human rights NGOs and good governance organizations. In terms of sustainability, it might have been advisable to fill strategic holes in service provision by reaching out to existing organizations working on domestic violence, such as help-lines, counseling centers or shelters whose caseload overlaps with trafficking. Consideration might be given to how grant guidelines and criteria could be written in future to accommodate the need for strategic alliances, sustainable protection structures and comprehensive services.

### **No assessment of capacity building needs of Phase One and Phase Two Grantees**

There was value in mobilizing the skills of Phase One and Phase Two grantees in providing training as these were generally longer-standing NGOs with greater capacities in anti-trafficking. However, these organizations are not without their own capacity building needs. No assessment of their skills

---

<sup>19</sup> This donor coordination will continue to be an important aspect of counter-trafficking work. Please see section 'Looking Forward' for further discussion of how this can continue to take place in future. There is a need to agree on suitable and effective mechanisms for coordination between TACT and CAAHT as well as government counterparts.

<sup>20</sup> Some also requested the distribution of more trafficking related material to support their work as well as other resources related to their field of expertise (i.e. law, psychological, social work, childcare, medical care). One suggestion, echoed by a few organizations, was a regular newsletter to include trafficking related resources, upcoming events and trainings and GO and NGO contacts and programs.

and training needs was undertaken, raising questions about the criteria used to assess which organizations required assistance. Systematic needs assessments of all grantees should have been undertaken as a first step in developing capacity-building strategies within the program.

Indeed many organizations expressed the desire for training and technical inputs, which might have been facilitated through the CAAHT program. This is also an issue of exit strategy. By increasing the capacity of all NGOs, this facilitates sustainability and hastens an exit strategy, which is the end objective of the CAAHT program.

### **Awareness raising not based on systematic knowledge of target audience or knowledge base**

With few exceptions, awareness-raising efforts were undertaken without a systematic assessment of the knowledge base, capacities and experiences of the target audience. This baseline information is central in designing appropriate and effective programs. It is important to know what knowledge and understanding already exists within the target group, how the target group accesses information and digests messages, what information is needed to prevent trafficking, who within the family/community is involved in decision making, what messages do and do not work, etc. As importantly, this baseline is the information against which results and program impact are measured.

## **D. TACT Program**

### **D1. Strengths**

#### **Proactive and holistic consideration of vulnerable children beyond child victims of trafficking**

The TACT program considers trafficking as a critical child protection issue, firmly situated within the framework of child protection. This is a sustainable approach in the longer term and is embedded in Tdh's overall mission statement to care for children.<sup>21</sup> This is also a strategic approach in that it draws a broad group of NGOs to the issue of trafficking, thereby mobilizing more resources and skills. In practice, this means that more exploited children are potentially captured within the mandate of the program and partner programs.

#### **Standard ID file for child beneficiaries**

Within the TACT program there is a standardized case file for each beneficiary, which allows for systematic case handling. This type of data is valuable in terms of developing an assistance plan and noting developments and improvements over time as well as factors that may exacerbate vulnerability. Case files ease the process in transferring cases between offices and staff and creates institutional memory. As importantly, this data is essential for M&E work – in terms of donor reporting and in terms of noting changes in trends and patterns, which allows for the tailoring of programmatic responses. Importantly, TACT maintains case files not only for VoTs but for all assisted 'at risk' children, allowing the program to capture the issues of vulnerability and exploitation more generally.

#### **International network and attention to transnational cooperation**

Transnational cooperation – through the Tdh alliance and by forging new relationships – is an important strategic approach, effective and essential in combating this transnational issue. This allows for advance planning and response in the return of trafficking and vulnerable children. This strategy is

---

<sup>21</sup> The International Federation Terre des Hommes is a network of eleven national organizations working for the rights of children and to promote equitable development without racial, religious, political, cultural or gender-based discrimination. See <http://www.terredeshommes.org/>.

impeded by lack of cooperation from Greek authorities in terms of notification about child returns as well as unwillingness to delay returns when no reintegration options are immediately available. However, there have been substantial improvements over past years. The related activities of Tdh in Moldova, Kosovo, and Romania further strengthens and benefits from its Albania work, allowing also for cross pollination of ideas and strategies. Links with Kosovo in particular will also contribute to cross border safe returns. Continued advocacy will be required in TACT 3. The profile of Tdh internationally lends credibility to TACT's (and BKTF's) work and advocacy efforts, however, it will be important to keep this in balance toward more prominence of local organizations in advocacy efforts.

### **Focused on sustainable civil society capacity and partnerships**

TACT's focus on civil society capacity translates into trust and improved working relationships in the long term, which, in turn, leads to cooperation and collaboration. It is an important step towards sustainability of civil society in the area of child protection and an effective exit strategy for Tdh as an international NGO. Fortified civil society on child protection issues spreads responsibility for the issue, which makes it more manageable to address given the scope and complexity of the problem. In the long run, the role of civil society is as a partner to and potential watchdog for the government of Albania. Tdh efforts focus in this direction. That being said, some organizations, including some BKTF members, reported not being clear about the specifics of TACT's work, flagging the value in increased sharing of strategies, results and experiences within these civil society partnerships.

### **Role of outreach workers in terms of prevention and protection**

Outreach is a vital component of social service programs like TACT. In a country like Albania, where social workers have not traditionally been engaged in service provision, it is also a new strategy. This outreach work serves as a link with vulnerable communities, builds trust between animators and community members and affords information to the community about trafficking and child exploitation. The work also provides an example of social work that is actively engaged with community and involved in problem solving. This model can be replicated by government as it moves toward social sector reform. In the interim, the model can provide the basis for the government's initial interventions according to a more active model of social services.

## **D2. Weaknesses**

### **Lack of clear definitions and categories (i.e. 'services', 'reintegration', 'at risk')**

The TACT program lacks standardized definitions for program components, services offered and categories of beneficiaries. Standardization is required to ensure that staff can act appropriately in assisting different categories of beneficiaries according to case management protocols. Also important is that definitions and meanings be clear to donors, program partners and other anti-trafficking organizations. For example, 'reintegration' in most trafficking programs in the SEE region refers to the long-term process of victim's return to 'normal' life in their community and/or family of origin, including assistance such as medical, psychological and legal assistance, job placement, material support, etc. However, the TACT program blurs 'reintegration' in the family with school reintegration, two distinct issues, as well as applies the term both for children who have been trafficked as well as those deemed at risk of trafficking. Treating these two very different situations as the same leads to confusion about the number of assisted victims as well as their assistance needs<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> There is value in disaggregating actual victims of trafficking from those deemed at risk of trafficking. While all may be potentially vulnerable to trafficking, these are nevertheless two distinct groups. Focusing on actual victims can be vital in terms of identifying sites of vulnerability as well as resiliency factors. Focus on children at risk – who have not been trafficked in spite of vulnerability factors – may yield information not only in terms of

Further, TACT offices do not have a consistent policy on what period of time constitutes full reintegration. In Korca, cases are followed for up to three years; Tirana staff reported that cases are frozen or closed at three and six months respectively;<sup>23</sup> and in the 2005 Performance Results Assessment (PRA) reintegration is defined as a minimum period of three months (USAID 2005: 9). There needs to be uniformity of definitions and categories within the TACT program. Similarly, TACT reports refer to ‘services’ for ‘at risk’ children. While ‘services’ are generally assumed to mean assistance or protection services such as medical care, legal assistance, job placement, school reinsertion, TACT uses ‘services’ to refer to prevention information shared.

To allow for comparability of information and results as well as impact, AT programs should generally conform to international definitions. There is a need for systematic comparison of data and impact both within the TACT programs, within USAID, as well as between organizations and programs, in order to develop effective practices and responses. In developing standard definitions, it may be valuable not only to solicit inputs from USAID (and other USAID programs), but also inputs from other partner organizations. This has a particular resonance as TACT continues to work closely with the BKTF coalition and where clear definitions can ease communication and cooperation between programs.

From a strategic position, the blurring of definitions and concepts avoids a policy discussion about the issue of child exploitation generally. That is, because the focus is kept on trafficking by grouping together a range of different vulnerable groups under the rubric of ‘trafficking’, it is more difficult to identify and highlight other issues of child exploitation. The TACT program has a mandate and operational aspect that is broader than trafficking but the way in which data is presented (due to the blurring of definitions and meaning) continues to profile child trafficking rather than child protection more generally.

### **Institutional bias against alternative care options**

Generally within the TACT program, there is a bias against alternative options and toward immediate family reintegration. Reintegration is generally pursued even in situations when there is evidence of family complicity in trafficking, with the argument that case follow-up and material assistance will mitigate these risk factors. While there have been some referrals to shelter families and other care options, the majority of beneficiaries are immediately returned to their family. The program has not extensively explored alternative care options and little attention has been paid to developing such possibilities. This translates into lack of alternatives options to family reintegration.<sup>24</sup> This bias has

---

programmatic intervention but also in terms of identifying why some children are trafficked and others are not. How reintegration is undertaken and may (or may not) be effective for these distinct groups is important toward identifying strategies and results. It is also important to disaggregate these groups for clarity in terms of presenting the different forms of exploitation and profiles of children assisted by the organization. It is important to clearly quantify the number of actual victims of trafficking relative to other forms of exploitation, as this informs assistance and services required, as well as identifies new trends and issues.

<sup>23</sup> While different organizations establish different time thresholds for what constitutes successful reintegration, this is generally a longer period of time – often a minimum of two years. This timeframe is consistent with the reintegration of other vulnerable groups – street children, working children, trafficking victims, child combatants, etc. Where cases are followed only for short periods of time – three or six months – one can be reasonably concerned about what happens after this period. Where cases are quantified as ‘successful reintegration’ after short periods of time, this distorts the reality of what constitutes successful reintegration and may cause confusion amongst donors about what is required – in time and resources – for meaningful and sustainable reintegration. This, in turn, may lead to less funding available to service providers and more demands for immediate results which may not be feasible and may translate into continued vulnerability.

<sup>24</sup> Alternative options need not be large state institutions or orphanages but may include foster care, boarding schools, placement with religious organizations, placement with extended family, etc. These temporary solutions are vital in providing time to conduct appropriate safety and family assessment prior to reintegration.

also resulted in a failure to develop protocols and analytical tools to do systematic security and family assessments. Protocols for undertaking these assessments are important, and should not be left to the judgment of individual social workers.

The lack of options for temporary care means that family assessments are done in haste – most children are returned to their families within a day or two – and cannot be said to be comprehensive. While, ideally, family reunification (accompanied by family counseling and support) should be pursued for trafficked minors, the issue of family involvement in trafficking poses serious difficulties in reintegration, including risks of re-trafficking. Going forward, this issue of alternative options must be considered, particularly in light of the increased complicity of families in the trafficking process.

### **Appropriateness of prevention programs**

According to victim profiles from TACT, most trafficked children had little education or had never attended school. Some questions may therefore be asked about primarily targeting sensitization in schools (where children were deemed at high risk of trafficking)<sup>25</sup> as compared to also systematically targeting early school leavers and informal education venues. Similarly, trafficking children assisted by TACT were primarily Egyptian and Roma minorities. However, children who participated in sensitization programs were largely ethnic Albanians and limited efforts were made to work directly with minority communities in undertaking systematic sensitization. Also of note is the limited attention paid to engaging parents in sensitization and preventions efforts. However, available information from TACT beneficiaries suggests that it is, in fact, parents who make the decision for the child to work abroad. Further, even where children migrate independently, they generally seek their parent's advice in making this decision. For example, in a FGD held by the evaluation team in Lezha with twelve girls between 15 and 20 years old, all reported that they would discuss migration with their mothers or other family members.<sup>26</sup>

In going ahead with sensitization efforts, attention is needed to clear target groups and how the different profiles of minors and their families (of varying ages, education and backgrounds) process information, digest messages and come to decisions.<sup>27</sup> This may be addressed, in part, by linking prevention and reintegration components of the TACT program, drawing on the information about reintegrated children and the work of community animators. More generally, sensitization messages will need to be adapted over time and according to target group. Existing material – that uses trafficking patterns of travel to Greece, third party facilitation, etc – may no longer be appropriate. This is an important consideration in light of plans to handover existing sensitization materials to school focal points. Moreover, these materials should focus on child protection with trafficking as an integral component, particularly if they are to be built into school programs.

---

<sup>25</sup> In the evaluations team's discussion with school psychologists in Korca, each of whom was responsible for three to five schools, none reported having dealt with cases of trafficking amongst the students in their schools. Plans for handing over sensitization programs to school authorities may wish to consider this disconnect. As well, given that trends and patterns have apparently changed since the material was originally developed, this might also need to be considered in moving forward.

<sup>26</sup> The FGD was organized for the evaluation team by IGAP, a CAAHT grantee, with their program beneficiaries in Lezha on November 17, 2005. IGAP conducts awareness-raising efforts with out-of-school girls through regular meetings and discussions.

<sup>27</sup> A recent study (Gimon et al. 2003) reviewed various awareness-raising campaigns from the perspective of minors, with attention to how they saw and reacted to the messages. Often minors saw and understood the messages differently from how they were intended. One poster that used a bar code metaphor (a woman trapped behind a bar code to symbolize commodification of women in the trafficking process) was often misunderstood by children, with one minor noting 'I don't think it is a good idea to stand behind pipes'. Children surveyed did not understand the imagery of the bar code, possibly because they came from rural areas and had not been exposed to these. The report detailed various misinterpretations of awareness-raising materials by minors, highlighting that age, identity and individual experience does inform how minors digest (or fail to digest) prevention and protection messages (Surtees 2005b).

### **Provision of material assistance and limited attention to community development**

The provision of material assistance to beneficiary families raises issues of dependency as well as sustainability in the long term. There are also questions about effectiveness, as it is conceivable that some children continue to beg alongside attending school. As importantly, it constitutes a missed opportunity in terms of community development, which affords longer term and durable economic solutions for beneficiaries. ARSIS in Greece uses material assistance with parents on a time-limited basis to take care of immediate needs while setting goals for employment and self-sufficiency without the income from their children's street begging.

With some groups – like Amaro Drom<sup>28</sup> – already undertaking community development work amongst vulnerable populations, there is an opportunity for strategic partnerships. As well, other avenues for family income generation are available, including employment placement and micro-credit for parents of young children and for young adults, where appropriate. There are, however, limitations to both of these options, which will need to be addressed through careful program design and implementation. In terms of job placement, the program will likely face difficulties in accessing jobs through government employment placement centers as very few jobs are advertised in this way. Further, matching individuals with the skills and qualifications required may not be possible as so many of the target population generally have no or limited formal education. As well, discrimination against ethnic minorities and nepotistic hiring practices may also be factors in the success of employment placement.<sup>29</sup> Similarly, in terms of micro-credit options, there are necessarily concerns about how to undertake credit schemes with vulnerable groups who lack relevant education and experience and, thus, may not be successful in their business ventures.<sup>30</sup> Consideration must also be given to the potential negative impact of failed micro-credit efforts, which can put an already vulnerable family in debt and at further risk.<sup>31</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup> The organization undertakes community development work in nine Roma communities (Korca, Baltez, Morava, Kucova, Durres, Grabian, Levan, Saver and Novosela). This includes supporting community development initiatives (kindergartens, professional courses, community organizations, sewage system, sports activities, etc.) and income generating activities. Among the obstacles faced at the beginning of its intervention was skepticism from community members, an unwillingness to undertake community work on a voluntary basis and lack of communication with local authorities. For information, please see Amaro Drom 2005.

<sup>29</sup> Strategies to address these obstacles might include vocational training linked to credit programs, social entrepreneurship efforts, job placement tied to USAID's economic growth portfolio (including its MSMEs), etc. Some successes in terms of job placement have been realized by Tjeter Vision (Elbasan) and Women in Development (Shkodra).

<sup>30</sup> Other critical issues to consider are undertaking comprehensive business analysis including development of a business plan; employing staff within micro-credit program from beneficiary community; requiring vocational and business training as part of the loan process; etc. A possible model can be found in the work of NGO Italian Consortium of Solidarity (ICS) in Moldova, which, as part of its micro-credit program, includes comprehensive business planning, site visits to assess business plan, support of a psychologist who pays monthly monitoring visits beneficiaries, as well as psychosocial and recreational activities aimed at the empowerment of beneficiaries.

<sup>31</sup> In other countries, at-risk borrowers have been known to place a higher priority on repaying the debt than on their own self-worth and that of their family. Thus, the inability to make loan payments, either due to a failing business or pressures to spend the loan money on other family needs (e.g., medicine) or addictions (e.g. alcohol), can cause the borrower to turn to risky methods of getting money to repay the loan (e.g., loan sharks, prostitution, selling family assets or food, sending children to street begging, etc.).

## SECTION IV

---

### Coordination and Collaboration with Albanian government, Donors and NGOs

#### A. Overall Findings

##### **Information sharing vs. collaboration**

When evaluating the level of collaboration among the GOA, donors and NGOs, it is important to distinguish between information and collaboration. In general, the AT programs have mostly shared information, creating confusion when information-sharing activities are defined as “collaboration.” A criticism of the RCGs has been the lack of practical coordination and common action.<sup>32</sup> Although there is a value in information sharing, this must be expanded into more collaborative relationships and tangible results. In the current framework, collaboration is not being effectively monitored as the measurements are outputs (i.e., meetings taking place and attendance), not outcomes (i.e. concrete project, MOU). Moving toward a greater focus on collaboration should increase the likelihood of sustainable program impact and measurable results. To do that, the coordination activities should be oriented toward action and results with designated responsible parties.

The challenges to both information sharing and collaboration are many in Albania. The NGOs and government officials cooperate informally primarily on the basis of personal links and relations; for others there may also be jealousy about what the other knows. Coordination will require facilitation over a sustained period of time to build relationships and trust. Progress has already been made to establishing relationships with GOA, including some that are operational, by both the CAAHT and TACT programs as discussed in the *Program Impact*.

##### **Lack of action-oriented results within coordination meetings/mechanisms**

The coordination meetings and mechanisms, such as the working groups and RCGs, need to have action points, tasks, responsibilities and reporting requirements for participants. The measurable achievements should be the actions that result from a meeting, not the meeting itself. When a meeting is viewed as a result in and of itself, results oriented people may see this as an ineffective use of time and decrease participation in future. Participants should be held accountable for specific tasks and progress monitored accordingly. Also, there needs to be a balancing of meetings and networks that people are obliged to join to avoid overburdening them.

##### **Lack of strategic coordination between TACT and CAAHT programs (i.e. prevention, referrals, duplication, regional working groups)**

Going forward, there should be greater strategic coordination between TACT and CAAHT programs, for example:

- TACT staff should sit on the CAAHT grants review process. Also, donors and government actors should be included on the review committee to promote coordination;
- CAAHT and TACT should participate in the development of standardized definitions for M&E. There should also be support between the CAAHT and TACT M&E staff;
- A regular coordination function (also to include WLRI) should be established;

---

<sup>32</sup> See Performance Results Assessment (PRA): Anti-trafficking Special Objective 4.1, Reporting Period: October 1, 2004 to September 30, 2005. The PRA notes that the move to *qarku*-level RCGs is designed to address this concern by putting together government and NGO actors “who are structurally and politically positioned to make decisions and commitments together.”

- Joint programming options should be explored;
- Strategic grant-making by CAAHT to fill gaps, i.e. give grants divided by geography (grants in non-TACT areas), meshing with TACT and beneficiary focus (grants limited to adult AT activities in TACT areas), plus Tirana based networks (DV, human rights, hotlines, etc.);
- Decide on how the various working groups will mesh and allocate responsibility, i.e., that UNICEF, TACT, ILO-IPEC and CAAHT work together on these systems. Be careful about the arbitrary delineation of working groups into policy and operational because the two are so closely linked in many cases so as to render the distinction meaningless.

### **Need to explore other avenues of coordination (International Consortium Meetings, IOs )**

The **International Consortium** meetings offer an opportunity for information sharing and cooperation. At the International Consortium Meeting held on November 17, the new GOA presented their vision and strategy to international community in the areas of law enforcement and criminal justice. Presentations were made by the Minister of the Interior, the Albanian State Police, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Finance, and the Prosecutor General. WLRI also participated. The International Consortium will establish a working group on witness protection<sup>33</sup>; through their involvement, CAAHT and TACT will potentially play a role in guarding victims' rights. Additionally, CAAHT and TACT could more actively engage with donors working on AT and related activities. These include **IOM** (TIP, migration issues), **OSCE** (TIP, human rights issues), **UNICEF** (TIP, child protection issues), **ILO-IPEC** (TIP, labor rights, child labor issues), etc.

## **B. CAAHT Program**

### **B1. Strengths**

#### **Outreach to NGOs across the country and inclusiveness in activities**

Many of the NGOs interviewed noted that CAAHT succeeded in reaching out to NGOs across the country and broadened the reach of grant opportunities to new partners. Both government and NGOs alike felt included in CAAHT activities, even those who were not grant recipients.

#### **Direct work and interaction with local government through working groups and grantees**

The RCGs and the grant process pushed CAAHT grantees and local government officials to meet and interact with each other. This translated into joint efforts and projects in some instances. In some areas, this work constitutes the first AT work undertaken by government at local levels.

### **B2. Weaknesses**

#### **More attention needed to mobilize ownership of the issue and actions by local government actors**

More attention is needed in encouraging the government to take the lead on the AT issue and, thus, increase the buy-in of government entities. Moreover, moving toward sustainability will require that meetings are located in government offices rather than in paid premises such as hotels. CAAHT should providing technical support and resources, including perhaps equipment donation and possible staff secondments.

## **C. TACT Program**

---

<sup>33</sup> The law on witness protection has only recently been passed and still has many legal and practical problems to be worked out.

## **C1. Strengths**

### **Long-standing, reliable partnerships including some government actors**

TACT had achieved extensive coordination on TIP issues due to its long-standing partnerships with NGO and government actors. For example, the relationship among Tdh, NPF and the AT police in Korca has been critical in assistance to children returning from Greece, including identification, reception at the border, service provision, and reintegration into their home communities. The Elbasan working group is another example of an operational partnership with the government and NGOs.

### **Member of and support to BKTF**

TACT has played a role in collaboration with child protection agencies, including advocacy and service provision through its membership in and support to BKTF. Tdh has provided significant technical inputs to BKTF toward supporting Albanian coalition development, and has let the coalition be the voice (Albanian) rather than undertake advocacy as a Swiss organization (Tdh).

### **Working with different donors**

TACT is not entirely reliant on USAID as a single funder, indicating that it is a program that different donors buy into through funding. Tdh also has long-standing relationships with different donors and IOs, increasing their capacity for collaborative work in a wide range of donor networks.

## **C2. Weaknesses**

### **Limited success in mobilizing social workers in outreach and service provision**

TACT has had only limited success in their attempts to mobilize government social workers for outreach and service provision. Tdh is a relative latecomer to this type of work with the government considering how long they have undertaken service provision. Their incremental success needs to be increased, and perhaps different approaches will be required to more strategically enhance cooperation with social workers.

### **Inadequate attention in the past to government collaboration**

Tdh has a long history of working on child trafficking and protection issues with limited government collaboration. The TACT program now includes work with the Ministry of Public Order and more limited cooperation with MoLSAEE and the Ministry of Education. The evaluation team does recognize that the some government offices are not receptive to collaboration with NGOs and that the GOA's social work philosophy does not easily mesh with that of Tdh. Nevertheless, TACT will need to continue seeking out new approaches to improve its collaboration with government actors to achieve sustainable results in child protection.

## SECTION V

---

### USAID: Internal and External coordination

The willingness of USAID/Albania to be creative in programs and responsive to various AT initiatives and strategies is to be lauded and continued. Moving toward a successful exit strategy and greater sustainable AT efforts will require greater coordination within USAID, among all USG programs, and donors and IOs.

#### **Greater coordination and information sharing within USAID**

The question of internal coordination was raised in anticipation of the upcoming administrative shift of the AT programs from Special Objective status to a component of the DG portfolio. This shift offers an opportunity for greater coordination and possibilities for joint programming and overlapping target groups.

- Within the **Democracy and Governance** portfolio, AT activities could overlap in the areas of (i) NGO capacity building, (ii) support to human rights networks, and (iii) legal reform through WLRI. The type of TA offered by ANTTARC to the Phase Three grantees could be provided by a NGO capacity building activity, leaving the TIP-specific TA for AT technical experts. The NGOs working on AT activities should be natural allies to human rights organizations, and could also collaborate with WLRI on legal reform. See below on *Relationship between civil society and government*;
- The **Economic Growth** office has already begun exploring joint programming in the area of microfinance for certain populations at risk for trafficking, including the Roma and Egyptians. Other links with AT activities include raising issues of sex tourism when working with the tourist board and hotels, and including relevant aspects of TIP in business ethics curricula and training;
- There may be opportunities for collaboration with the **Health** office on TIP issues through their school health education curriculum and the civic forum from the health promotion activity.

#### **Relationship between civil society and government**

Because USAID is focused on civil society development, there are times when not enough attention is paid to developing lines of communication between civil society and government. Often NGOs are established to address unmet needs in society as separate parallel entities to government offices that are unable or unwilling to act. More attention is needed to better integrate and coordinate civil society's activities in a variety of areas where government have the primary responsibility. The relationship between civil society and government is particularly critical to the long-term success and sustainability of AT programs as foreign donors decrease their commitment and the government is left to assume responsibility. CAAHT has played a role in this direction by facilitating better communication and information sharing that can form the basis of coordinated action. CAAHT has also been involved in profiling and advocating for the implementation of the anti-trafficking strategies of the government.

#### **Other USG Activities: Democracy Commission, OPDAT and ICITAP**

The connection and variety of USG activities creates an opportunity for greater collaboration to maximize results and synergies among programs. The establishment of an inter-agency AT working

group at the US Embassy, including representatives from ICITAP, OPDAT, USAID, the Democracy Commission, and any other relevant offices, would better facilitate information-sharing and opportunities for cooperation

The *Democracy Commission* has increased its grant funds to more than \$500,000 per year, creating an opportunity to fund a wide variety of projects and to check the credibility and experience of NGOs who may have AT and related social protection experience. The Commission review panel includes a variety of donors as well as the USAID AT specialist, resulting in information-sharing and even coordination of efforts.

**OPDAT and ICITAP** are active in criminal law and law enforcement reform, and intersect with the prosecution aspect of the USG response to TIP. USAID's AT activities should link with those of OPDAT who is focusing on witness protection by ensuring that service providers are part of the discussion as laws, regulations, and policies are developed. Similarly, when ICITAP develops police training curricula, it should include issues such as TIP, migration, DV and minority rights, etc.

### **Coordinating with donors working in social sector**

USAID/Albania can also play a key role in coordinating with other donors working on social sector issues. In particular, the AT programs should continue to follow the progress of the World Bank's social sector reform. BKTF has already commented on recently drafted social services standards. Other areas of donor coordination include ILO-IPEC's regional child labor/child trafficking activities (which includes a monitoring function at local levels), and the establishment of UNICEF's child protection working groups. Coordination with UNICEF should also include ensuring that CAAHT grantees are included in UNICEF's workplan as CAAHT phases out.

### **USAID's Role with Other AT Donors**

Discussions with other donors indicated that they are pulling away from AT work and will continue to do so over the coming years. USAID/Albania should consider taking a role in advocacy to keep attention on the issue, and also to keep the focus on social components rather than strictly law enforcement, which tends to be focus of EU (and ICITAP and OPDAT).

**SIDA** funds AT programs, including part of TACT II and IOM as part of its regional AT program. Current SIDA funding lasts until end of 2006, and TIP is not likely to get the same level of funding in later years. While there will likely be funding through SIDA past 2006, the precise configuration of this funding is not yet determined. **SDC** funds NPF, but are not otherwise funding AT work. The **Dutch Embassy** currently co-funds with CAAHT the reintegration program of D&E but will not continue after this funding cycle. The absence of other donors will likely leave a chasm, especially assistance and reintegration assistance when USAID AT funding ends. This is concerning given that numbers of victims have not declined.

## SECTION VI

---

### Looking Forward – Issues and Recommendations

#### A. General Issues and Recommendations

##### **Addressing trafficking within the framework of social protection**

In response to the issue of trafficking, there has developed in Albania an emergent assistance framework. But it is worth considering if a specialized assistance model for trafficking victims is the best strategy in terms of appropriate services and future sustainability. That is, is it preferable to assist trafficking victims within a specific paradigm of trafficking or are their needs better met through more broad based assistance, under the framework of social protection? Further, it is valuable to consider the inter-related aspects of protection needs. While trafficking victims do have distinct needs and require specialized assistance, these needs (and the associated services) often overlap in important ways with other vulnerable groups.<sup>34</sup> There are also questions of sustainability in the long term – that is, if parallel assistance frameworks are viable in the long term, particularly given the on-going decrease in donor funding for AT efforts and the limited financial capacity of the GOA.

As important, the GOA has decided to look at social protection generally,<sup>35</sup> and, in the interests of local ownership and sustainability, USAID efforts should be consistent with the lead of the government in terms of their self-articulated priorities. TIP needs to be considered as a social protection issue within social sector more generally, and AT programs can be an important (and model) component of developing social services. Models and mechanisms established as part of anti-trafficking work can be modified and adapted to social protection more generally. AT programs can play a role in supporting the general development of social services and working toward a sustainable protective environment.

Although there may be hesitancy to broaden into a social protection strategy, this recommendation takes a more limited approach of maintaining the specific focus on trafficking, but doing so within a framework of social protection. This should not be viewed as a shift from USAID’s mandate from Washington; rather a strategic choice given the limited funding ahead for trafficking and legitimate concerns regarding sustainability. Further, addressing social protection is a strategic and effective entry point for addressing trafficking in persons, both from a prevention and assistance perspective.

##### **Sustainability of trafficking efforts as well as an effective exit strategy**

Issues of sustainability and exit strategy must be firmly embedded in the design and implementation of the next phase of both programs with both GOA and civil society actively engaged in this process. There are various ways that sustainability can be supported in moving forward with USAID’s AT programs, including secondments to the government, joint NGO/government pilot projects, appointment of advisors, etc.

---

<sup>34</sup> Central to this discussion is a consideration of whether the needs and experiences of trafficked are distinct or whether needs can be met within child protection programs. That is, migrating UAMs, street children, working children are all exposed to exploitation and their assistance needs are often similar to those of trafficked children. It is worth considering in what ways the needs of trafficked minors different to those of abused and/or exploited minors more generally (Surtees 2005b). Similar questions may be asked about adult trafficking and the associated assistance needs.

<sup>35</sup> In 2004 the Government of Albania passed the Law on Assistance and Social Services, which provides the framework for social service reform and implementation of the new Strategy of Social Services. This process foresees proactive social services implemented at the community level.

There are some positive signals of attention to sustainability in some quarters, particularly by civil society. For example, two of CCF's three kindergartens in Kukes region are supported by the community, operated with volunteers and donations from members.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, Women in Development in Shkodra and Tjeter Vision in Elbasan are working to establish businesses, which will support vulnerable families as well as generate income toward NGO programs.

Nevertheless, it is important to be realistic in terms of what can be sustained without donor funds. The government of Albania may be able to fill only some of the gaps left by a withdrawal of AT funds. This is particularly of concern when speaking about social services, such as counseling or reintegration programs, which are costly and labor intensive. Steps need to be taken to ensure that these programs and/or their activities are sustainable beyond the next tranche of funding. As such, sustainability of AT work must be firmly embedded in future program design, with particular attention to areas such as protection and assistance. This includes investment in staff capacity to develop sustainable skills beyond the life of the program as well as skills that can be transferred to the government or civil society. Another strategic approach is to work with communities to identify solutions, strategies and resources which are sustainable without donor funding. In terms of victim assistance, this may involve community foster care programs or local boarding schools, while for prevention this may include community development initiatives and local income generation projects.

### **Urgent need for development of case management protocols as well as standards of care**

Case management protocols are required for all assistance programs, including training in the implementation of standards. In the interests of sustainability and local ownership, this process should be pursued not only in cooperation with USAID programs but also with local partners and government actors. The government must be proactively engaged in this process to ensure it meets their long-term social protection needs and allows for government ownership of the process. This links importantly with issues of sustainability and quality of care.

While protocols and standards should be developed collaboratively with government and civil society, it is the larger programs like TACT and CAAHT as well as international organizations, which may need to take lead as they have the resources to develop these protocols. However, all interested organizations should be included in process to whatever capacity and time they can afford. Collaboratively articulated standards and protocols can then be implemented by a wide range of organizations and overseen through coordination mechanisms within MoLSAEE.

Also salient is that trafficking victims are diverse – women, men and children of both sexes – with their own specific assistance needs. Case management protocols and standards of care must reflect this diversity. Moreover, considering the needs of victims is an ongoing process with new at-risk and vulnerable groups regularly being identified.<sup>37</sup> Attention to diversity amongst victims and changes in profiles and experiences is essential. Finally, case monitoring and follow-up poses particular problems in the case of minors. There needs to be continuity of care in the long term and enduring attention to

<sup>36</sup> It should be noted that one of the key aspects for the sustainability of the kindergartens were (i) the limited number of staff involved (ii) staff salaries at a local rate (rather than an inflated rate often paid by IOs and donor-funded program) and (iii) the use of community/family volunteers.

<sup>37</sup> For example, service providers at the 'Minors and Child-Friendly Wing' of the IOM rehabilitation centre in Moldova currently work with five distinct target groups of minors: 1) minor victims of trafficking (generally 14-16 year-old girls trafficked for sexual exploitation), 2) children trafficked with their mother/parent, 3) mothers who return home pregnant or with a baby; 4) children left in Moldova while their mother was trafficked and reunited with the mother during her rehabilitation; and 5) minors victims of trafficking (young males, 16-17 years old).

minors, which is not always necessary (or desirable) for adults. This, too, must be built into protocols and standards

### **Further strengthening and tailoring of M&E efforts**

Efforts to further strengthen the M&E components of the program should be a priority.<sup>38</sup> The development of appropriate indicators has generally been under-considered in AT work. USAID programs have a unique opportunity to develop appropriate and results oriented indicators to effectively measure anti-trafficking program impact. Time should be taken to develop, test and adapt these indicators. Importantly, inputs from field staff and grantees will be required to ensure that indicators are responsive and appropriate, yielding helpful information in terms of measuring as well as toward program modification. At the same time, consideration should be given to how much time is needed to collect data relative to other staff responsibilities. Also important is to look to potential negative impacts of counter-trafficking work and evaluate if and where these result from AT interventions. Finally, in the future, greater use should be made of the data collected, in terms of tailoring programs, informing partners and government about new trends and patterns and toward advocacy.

### **Need for increased coordination between AT organizations and programs**

In moving forward there is a need for more concerted, strategic coordination between anti-trafficking programs. Importantly, there is a need for strategic coordination between TACT and CAAHT (and WLRI). And in moving forward it is recommended that USAID be more intentional in this regard, building coordination into the work of all programs. There is also a need to increase coordination with other donors like ILO-IPEC and UNICEF to avoid duplication or conflict between programs and ensure that NGOs are supported by these donors beyond the CAAHT program. There is also a need for greater coordination with USAID, between sectors, to strategically strengthen efforts with joint objectives and goals.<sup>39</sup>

### **Increased attention is needed to Roma and Egyptian minorities in AT efforts**

Given the acute vulnerability of ethnic minorities to trafficking in Albania, more attention is needed to this target group. As importantly, a shift to an empowerment approach is needed whereby communities are engaged in the discussion about the problem as well as solutions. Empowerment of minority groups need not only be a concern of anti-trafficking programs. Strategic alliance can be forged with organizations and government departments working in a range of areas, including human rights, good governance, health, economic development, gender, violence, etc.

### **Consider possibility of other forms of trafficking and profiles of victims in future programs**

The majority of identified and assisted trafficking victims have been adult women trafficked for sexual exploitation and children trafficked for sexual exploitation, labor, begging and delinquency. However, it is important not to preclude the possibility of other forms of trafficking and profiles of victims.<sup>40</sup> For example, IOM Tirana assisted eight Chinese nationals in 2004 and 29 foreign nationals

---

<sup>38</sup> For specific suggestions, please see section Program Design, Implementation, Strategy and Operation.

<sup>39</sup> For specific suggestions, please see section: *USAID: Internal and External Coordination*.

<sup>40</sup> Labor exploitation was an increasingly prominent form of exploitation to SEE in 2003 and 2004. Victims exploited exclusively for labor purposes accounted for 7.2 per cent of victims in 2003 and 4.1 per cent in 2004. Further, when victims trafficked for a combination of labor and other forms of exploitation are considered, the percentage increases significantly, to 25.8 per cent in 2003 and 12.6 per cent in 2004 (Surtees 2005a: 37-38). Victims assisted in SEE in 2004 included adult men. For example, in Montenegro, four Ukrainian male victims of trafficking for labor were identified by law enforcement as a result of a multi-country Interpol operation (Surtees 2005a: 403).

in 2005 (from China, Turkey, Egypt, Romania, Czech, India, Nigeria, Greece and Moldova, including five women, identified while being smuggled/trafficked through Albania. Many of these nationals manifested strong signals of trafficking vulnerability (Surtees 2005a: 89, cf. IOM Tirana).<sup>41</sup> As well, there have been allegations of trafficking in Albanian minors for adoption.<sup>42</sup> Also, both Tdh and ARSIS pointed to the trend of fewer UAMs in Thessaloniki and more parents accompanying their children to Greece to exploit them directly without paying middlemen. In other places, like Slovenia, Albanian UAMs have increasingly been identified, requiring a tailored response.<sup>43</sup>

Attention to different types of victims requires skills in identification by law enforcement and service providers<sup>44</sup> as well as openness to the provision of assistance and protection as less common cases are identified. Assistance and response for all victims must be available in an emergency, with the possibility to make longer-term changes in program implementation as needed. Program staff and donors must be sufficiently flexible in responding to gaps and issues as they arise. As such, it is important to be mindful of these possibilities in the development of protocols and guidelines in order that other forms of trafficking are not excluded.

### **Implications of withdrawing funds, given USAID's prominence as AT donor in Albania**

USAID is currently the most prominent donor for AT efforts, with most donors withdrawing from AT work. Advocacy may be required by USAID in terms of mobilizing other donors to consider the issue within their portfolio.<sup>45</sup> Particularly effected governments, like Greece, the UK and Italy, have been largely absent from anti-trafficking efforts in Albania and might be persuaded to increasingly act on this issue. Similarly, with plans underway for stabilization and association talks with the EU, more EU funding may be mobilized on AT efforts. There are some types of anti-trafficking work that cannot be easily funded by other donors. For example, provision of services is an expensive area of work and some donors, like the US Embassy, are prohibited from funding such activities. As such, some organizations and anti-trafficking efforts will be more adversely affected by a USAID withdrawal and such considerations should ideally be built into an exit strategy.

## **B. Specific Issues and Recommendations**

### **B1. CAAHT Program**

---

<sup>41</sup> All had incurred large debts; some had Albanian visas but had never been to the Albanian embassy; all documentation and travel arrangements were made through third parties; they were not clear about the type of work they would do, etc. Most were also very frightened and reluctant to talk on the subject.

<sup>42</sup> See Albanian News Agency 2003, Kurir 2004, Wood 2003. In addition, two different organizations interviewed during fieldwork reported the selling of children within their community. This is consistent with findings from other countries in SEE, like Bulgaria, where in 2004 nine children were identified and assisted, having been trafficked for adoption, with allegations of more than 30 other such cases by the Bulgarian authorities (Surtees 2005a: 195).

<sup>43</sup> While not trafficked, these minors are acutely vulnerable to trafficking either in another attempt to leave Albania or once abroad. They may also go unrecognized as trafficking victims. UAMs need to be more consciously included and considered in program given their specific needs and in recognition of the different development stages of youth. ISS assisted 298 new cases in 2004 of Albanian minors abroad, the majority of whom have migrated abroad with the consent of their families (ISS 2004). Further, according to a recent rapid assessment by CCF in Kukes region, most boys and their parents see migration abroad for work as their responsibility to help support their family.

<sup>44</sup> Because so much attention in SEE has been focused on young women trafficked for sexual exploitation, most identification criteria is tailored to this profile of victim. The result is that many within law enforcement are without the skills to identify other profiles of victims. For example, in 2004, Serbian police identified 'potential victims' – young women not yet exploited but manifesting strong signals of being in the trafficking process – signalling significant improvement in identification. However, a number of victims of labor trafficking went unidentified by Serbian authorities and were deported Romania, flagging the need for improved skills in the identification of other forms of trafficking (Surtees 2005a: 497, 513).

<sup>45</sup> For a more thorough discussion of this point, please see section Coordination and Collaboration with Albanian Government, Donors and NGOs.

**AT technical expertise**

The level of AT technical expertise within CAAHT should be enhanced toward more sustainable efforts going forward. To start, a needs assessment will identify staff skills and needs; a plan should be developed to meet identified gaps. Any provider of the TA will need to be appropriately skilled and experienced on a range of trafficking issues including program design and implementation. With the added expertise, CAAHT will be able to shift part of their focus to content issues related to the various activities they fund. The greater attention to the technical components of their work will help ensure the sustainability of capacity both to provide quality services directly to beneficiaries and to effectively continue quality work/linkages among NGOs and government.

**Issues of quality control in terms of implementing grants**

CAAHT should monitor and provide TA to grantees to ensure quality control of AT interventions being implemented through grants. Quality control should cover the grants review process, workplan approval, monitoring of project activities, and measuring results. In addition to inputs and quality control through CAAHT staff, external inputs may be of assistance. Reliable experts can be accessed to provide technical inputs and skills, forming a panel of external resource persons to be drawn upon as needed.

**Successful exit strategy and sustainability including sustainability of government and NGOs** As a USAID planned activity, CAAHT is not expected to continue as an entity beyond the life of the contract. The staff and management will have to operate explicitly under this premise and actively work their way out of their jobs. Workplans must reflect this exit strategy with outputs being realistic and tangible within the time remaining. This will likely require different types of interactions, especially with government actors, and incentives toward sustainability, e.g., the local government establishes a budget for services (that should continue after CAAHT) and CAAHT provides needed equipment or covers other one-time expenses.

**B1. TACT Program****Sustainability and localization**

The focus on sustainability and localization needs urgent consideration and should be linked in with key government partners (i.e. education, social services, employment sectors, etc.). Now that TACT has focused in this direction, additional efforts are needed to deepen the connections with government partners across the various sectors. The local working groups like those in Elbasan and Durres should assist this process become more operational.

**Standardization of definitions, standards and protocols**

The definitions, standards and protocols for TACT's operations need to be standardized among their offices in Albania, and, ideally, abroad as well. For specific suggestions, see section above in Program Design, Implementation, Strategy and Operations.

**Coordination with BKTF**

TACT's coordination with BKTF should continue with support of Albanian coalition as the voice on child trafficking issues. BKTF needs more leadership and participation from Albanians, and a more open process to accept members while maintaining the requisite quality control. TACT should support the internal strategy process and move forward with membership dues as sustainability option.



## ANNEX A

---

### Bibliography

Adam, S. (2004) *Emergency Response Against Child Trafficking (ERACT): Bilateral Project \ (Albania/Greece) Final Report*. Thessaloniki, Greece: ARSIS.

Albanian News Agency (2003) 'Albanian boy traded for TV set'. 30 September.

Amaro Drom (2005) *Community Development: Albanian Roma Union, Amaro Drom*. Tirana, Albania: SPOLU International Foundation and Amaro Drom.

Aronowitz, A. (2003) *Anti-Trafficking Programs in Albania*. Washington, DC: MSI.

Beddies, S., De Soto, H., Gedeshi, I. and D. Perez (2003) *Roma and Evgjits in Albania: From Social Exclusion to Social Inclusion*, World Bank, Soros Foundation, UNDP, United States Embassy, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation: Albania.

Centre for Legal Civic Initiatives (2005) *The Law: A Chance for Women's Development. Fifth year of edition, No. 3 (17), June 2005*. Tirana, Albania.

CAAHT Program Reports: Quarterly Reports (Oct-Dec 2003; Jan-Mar, Apr-June, July—Sept, Oct-Dec 2004; Jan-Mar, Apr-June 2005), Monthly Reports (Jan, Feb, Apr, May, July 2005).

CAAHT (2004) *The CAAHT Baseline Survey: A Summary*. Tirana, Albania: CAAHT and USAID.

CAAHT (2004) *Project Launch Conference Report*. Tirana, Albania: CAAHT.

CAAHT (2004) *Report from CAAHT Regional Introductory Workshops*. Tirana, Albania: CAII and CAAHT.

Edwards, D. (2003) *USAID Anti-Trafficking Workshop Report*. Tirana, Albania: TRG.

ICMC (2003) *National Report of Human Trafficking from Albania: Rapid Assessment Survey for ILO*, ICMC Center for Refugee and Migration Studies and ILO: Albania.

ILO IPEC (2003) *Rapid Assessment of Trafficking in Children for Labour and Sexual Exploitation in Albania*. Tirana, Albania: ILO IPEC.

ISS (2004) *International Social Services Operation Activities in Albanian during 2004*. Tirana, Albania: ISS Albania Office.

Karoly, M. (2005) 'How to Talk about this to the 'Outside'?' *Quarterly Journal of the European Roma Rights Centre*. 2 (2005). Available at <http://www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=2294>. Site last accessed November 28, 2005.

*Kurir* (2004) 'Father sold five children', *Kurir*, 8 December.

Surtees, R. (2005a) *Second Annual Report on Victims of Trafficking in South-eastern Europe*. Belgrade, Serbia: Regional Clearing Point and IOM. Available at: [www.iom.int](http://www.iom.int). Site last accessed November 28, 2005.

Surtees, R. (2005b) *Alternatives Forms of Trafficking in Minors: Articulating Victims Profiles and Conceptualising Interventions* Paper presented at Childhoods Conference. Oslo, Norway. July.

Tozaj, D. *The State of Anti-Trafficking in Albania 2005: An Overview of Governance and Civil Society Policies and Programs*. Tirana, Albania: CAAHT

TACT Program Reports: Quarterly Reports 1-8, including annexes (2003 – 2005).

TACT (2005) *Review of TACT Performance*. Tirana, Albania: Terre des hommes (Tdh).

TACT (2005) *TACT Donor Meeting Report*. Tirana, Albania: Tdh.

TACT (2005) *21-Month Implementation Report*. Tirana, Albania: Tdh.

Tdh (2003) *The Trafficking of Albanian Children in Greece*. Tdh, UNICEF and Oak Foundation: Albania.

Tdh (2004) *Child Trafficking in South-eastern Europe: The Development of Good Practices to Protect Albanian Children*. Tdh, USAID, UNICEF, Sida, Oak Foundation and NAAC: Albania.

Tuxhari, A. (2005) *Report - meeting with the school psychologists, October 31, 2005*. Tdh Korca.

USAID (2003) *Albania Umbrella Anti Human Trafficking Initiative RFP*. Tirana, Albania: USAID.

USAID (2003) *TACT Cooperative Agreement*. Tirana, Albania: USAID.

USAID (2005) *Performance Results Assessment – reporting Period October 2004 to September 2005*. Tirana, Albania: USAID.

Vatra (2004) *Report on Trafficking in Human Beings for the Year 2003*. Vlora, Albania.

Women's Legal Rights Initiative (2005) *CEDAW Assessment Tool Report: Albania*. Tirana, Albania: WLRI.

Wood, N. (2003) 'For Albanians, it's come to this: a son for a TV'. *The New York Times*. November 13. Available at: <http://forums.adoption.com/t123258.html>. Last accessed 17 September 2004.

World Bank (2001) *The Road to Stability and Prosperity in SE Europe: A Regional Strategy Paper*. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at [www.seerecon.org/region/documents/wb/wbrs/chapter5.htm](http://www.seerecon.org/region/documents/wb/wbrs/chapter5.htm). Site last accessed November 28, 2005.

**ANNEX A****Organizations Consulted – Interviews and Focus Group Discussions**

<b>Location</b>	<b>Organization Consulted</b>	<b>Contact Person – Name and Position</b>
<b>Elbasan</b>	Tjeter Vision	Arian Cala, President
		Zeit Tabakan, Program Director
<b>Korca</b>	Terre des hommes (Tdh)	Alketa Tuxhari, Regional Project Coordinator
		Ermelinda Vila, Community Animator
		Manuela Topi, Community Animator
		Viktora Kapedani, Database Operator
		Miro Prifti, Regional Administrator
		Mariela Simo, Psychosocial Advisor
	<b>Dorcas Aid</b>	<b>Ilir Dishnica, Director</b>
		-----
	School Psychologists (Department of Education)	Lido Grifti, School Psychologist
		Enrieta Mustafa, School Psychologist
		Escurolda Marusku, School Psychologist
		Mimozac Masko, School Psychologist
		Diteo Tytmce, School Psychologist
	Ndihme per Femijet/Help the Children (NPF)	Robert Stratoberdha, Director
		Entela Fejzo, Program Staff
Regional Council	Fehmi Xhemo, President	
	Eva Dimitri, Staff	
Anti-Trafficking Police	Hytbi Dervishi, Chief	
<b>Lezha</b>	Institute for Gender and Applied Policy (IGAP) – Field Staff and Beneficiaries	Madalena Gega, Community Facilitator
		Miranda Fishka, Director
<b>Linza</b>	National Reception Centre (NRC)	Fatbardha Cako, Director
<b>Pogradec</b>	Intellectual Women of Pogradec	Majlinda Cuni, Staff
	Mothers of Orphans	Fatime Hoxhallari, Director
	Parents in Education	Lindita Ibrahimimi, Director
<b>Puka</b>	In Help of Northern Women	Bukurie Imeri, Director
		Valdete Sadria, Finance/Program Staff
<b>Shkodra</b>	Legal Clinic for Minors	Lulezim Gruemira, Psychologist
		Tonin Marku, Lawyer
		Vilma Shiroka, Psychologist
		Bardhyl Loha, Lawyer
	Shoqata Gruaja Ne Zhvillm Shkoder	Anila Gurakuqi, Director
	Family and Development Resource Centre	Alma Guli, Director
	Hope for the Future	Panvera Marku, Director
	Women in Development	Anila Trebiche, Director
		Fatbardha Caushi, Program Coordinator
		Julia Cepi, Social Worker
	All Children have the Same Human Value	Fatmir Lugji, Director
	Anti-Trafficking Police	Halit Murati, Head
	Regional State Social Services	Edmond Emini, Director
	Department of Education	Loro Mondri, Director
Kujtim Devvishi, Former Chief Inspector of Schools		
<b>Tirana</b>	Different and Equal (D&E)	Marjana Meshi, Director
	Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA)	Donika Godaj, Executive Director
	Institute for Gender and Applied Policy (IGAP)	Miranda Fishka, Executive Director
Etleva Plasa, IGAP Board Member		

Women's Legal Rights Initiative (WLRI)	Emira Shkurti, Women's Legal Right's Advisor
	Manjola Orgocka, Administrative Assistant
Ruga Me Pisha	Daniela Kurti, Researcher
	Erjon Lesko, Officer Manager
	Esmeralda Rudi, Drama Studio Director
	Ledi Dollaj, Script Editor
	Albana Korreshi, Finance Manager
Legal Clinic for Minors	Holta Kotherja, Director
	Klodian Gega, Psychologist
Coordinated Action against Human Trafficking (CAAHT)	Sarah Stephens, Chief of Party
	Dolor Tozaj, Local Program Coordinator
	Shpresa Spahiu, Program Specialist
	Alketa Gaxha, Grants Specialist
	Elvana Gadeshi, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist
	Entela Lezo, Finance Manager
	Etion Parruca, Administration and Resources Assistant
Terre des hommes – TACT staff	Claudian Durmishi, Driver and Logistician
	Thierry Agagliate, Head of Mission
	Aurel Koca, Operational Project Manager
	Mirela Shuteriqi, Child Protection Lawyer
	Merita Mece, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist
	Artur Marku, Investigation and Development Officer
	John Brogan, Administrator
Terre des hommes – Regional program	Elvis Kori, Finance and Administration
	Vincent Tournecueillert, Regional Child Protection Officer
Së Bashku Kundër Trafikimit të Fëmijëve (BKTF)	Holta Kotherja, President
	Elira Zaka, Coordinator
	Renata Kapidani, Field Information Officer
	Members of BKTF coalition from Legal Clinic for Minors, ICMC, Save the Children, Tdh, CCF, ISS
Albanian Foundation for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation of Disputes	Rasim Gjoka, Executive Director
International Social Services, Albania Office (ISS)	Lida Leskaj, Executive Director
Citizen's Advocacy Office (CAO)	<b>Mirjana -----</b>
International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC)	Leo McGillvary, Country Director
Children's Christian Fund (CCF)	Ingrid Jones, Country Director
Albanian National Training and Technical Assistance resource Centre (ANTTARC)	Myftar Doci, Program Director
Institute for Social and Psychological Studies (I3SP)	Suela Kuesi, Project Director
	Jorida Rustemi, Director of Institute
Centre for Local Civic Initiatives (CLCI)	Aurela Anastasi, Executive Director
Roma Union of Albania, Amaro Drom	Skender Velju, Executive Director
	Blerina Gjeka, Program Manager
	Adriatik Hasantari, Project Coordinator
ILO-IPEC	Snezhi Bedalli, National Program Manager
Save the Children	Steve Ashby, Country Director
	Anduena Shkurti, Program Coordinator

	OSCE Anti-Trafficking Unit	Matthias Kalusch, Head
		Ledia Beci, Program Assistant
	UNICEF	Galit Wolfensohn
	IOM	Ruth Rosenberg, Program Manager
		Silva Haxhiaj, Project Assistant
		Valbona Lenja, Project Coordinator
		Holta Koci, Job Coordinator
		Ana Bengtsson, Project Assistant
	USAID	Harry Birnholz, USAID Mission Director
		Arian Giantris, Anti-Trafficking Advisor
		Besiana Kadare, Anti-trafficking Specialist
		Son Hoang Nguyen, Economic Growth Team Leader
		Alma Kospiri, SME and Trade Development Specialist
		Bruce Kay, Democracy and Governance Team Leader
		Zhaneta Shatri, Health Specialist
Dutch Embassy	Suzanne de Kruijk, Attache	
	Marleen Monster, Second Secretary	
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), US Department of Justice	Bruce Hintz, Program Manager	
OPDAT, US Department of Justice	David Lewis, Resident Legal Advisor	
Ministry of Interior, Deputy Ministry	Michael Robinson, Advisor	
US Embassy	Angjelina Pistoli, Public Affairs Coordinator	
<b>Other Countries</b>	ARSIS (Greece)	Liana Chatzigeorgiou, Trafficking Program Coordinator, Thessaloniki
	SIDA/IOM (Geneva)	Helen Nilsson, AT specialist